THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

With the season of Advent at hand, while the life of nature is still in its winter sleep, the Church hears the call of the Spirit to watch for the Lord's coming, and girds herself for another year of her pilgrimage. In a large number of parishes and rural deaneries the Archbishops' Pastoral Letter is being implemented by a fresh attention to the claims and needs of sacred study. Meetings of chapters and of clerical societies are making this their especial task; and in some places Parochial Church Councils have transformed themselves into Church Tutorial Classes for corporate study during the coming months. A series of "Schemes for Study and Prayer" has been issued by the Archbishops' Advisory Committee under the general title of "A Way of Renewal," to aid and guide this movement; and we have no doubt that readers of Theology will be making their fullest contribution towards its effectiveness.

The schemes or syllabuses (that seems to be the usual plural !) which have been issued are only tentative, and criticisms and suggestions are invited. Our own mind inclines to the view that those hitherto issued tend to be too discursive, and to give too little place to the study of Scripture in the plan. The two criticisms are not unconnected. Not only do we believe that every true spiritual revival in the Church rests upon a return to the Bible, but from the purely practical standpoint knowledge of Scripture provides a common basis on which all who are gathered for study can stand together. The point could be met by suggesting for each section a passage or passages of Scripture which should be studied with the help of a good commentary before the class gathers; and it would be to a class so prepared that the group-leaders would introduce the matter of the new book or books recommended in the schemes. Without such

common basis, we should fear that the discussion might be very doctrinaire, and lead to the airing of a good many opinions which would lead nowhere.

We have received a copy of the three Visitation Charges delivered by the Bishop of Southwark last October, and now published under the title of *Secularism and Christian Unity*.* They deal respectively with Secularism, Reunion, and Unity and Order within our own Church; and an Address to Church Workers on the life and work of the Diocese is added. Where there is so much that is worth reading, it is invidious to draw special emphasis to any one part; but the first Charge, which deals with the progress of Secularism, faces the facts of our time so frankly and so ably that it gives this little volume a peculiar importance. We could wish that they had been given greater weight in the Church Assembly's debate on Religious Education last month. The Bishop of Durham showed himself alive to the problem; but he seemed entirely to miss the point that our Church Schools and Training Colleges are the greatest asset that we have at the moment in our endeavour to deal with it. There is a direct connection between the growth of secularism and the decrease of Church Schools; and the defence of our great educational tradition is one of the greatest services we can render to our country at the present time. Partial failure to make the best use of our Church schools is no reason for adopting a defeatist policy in regard to them. The proper course is to give training in the art of teaching a far larger place than it has at present in the preparation of ordinands for their life's work, and to improve the inspection of religious teaching in all schools.

* S.P.C.K. 1/- net.

WHAT IS A MYSTIC?—II.

IV.—PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

MIND AND SOUL.—In this life as we know it, in our actual concrete experience, we cannot separate the mind from the soul. No doubt certain centres in the brain do belong to the activities of the higher spiritual consciousness, but their functioning involves the functioning of the whole organism, and any spiritual activity involves the whole mind. The soul is not a department of the mind; it *is* the mind of man in its aspect of moral and spiritual consciousness. The Holy Spirit expresses Himself in terms of the human mind and it becomes His vehicle. As Life in the organism brings about fresh chemical combinations, realizing through them the unique processes and characteristics belonging only to the living thing, so the Spirit of God, by indwelling and working in the mind of man, sets free fresh powers, fresh forms of mental energy, and extends the sphere of consciousness. But it is the mechanism of the animal mind that is used, and the material organism which becomes the tool for these unique and distinctly spiritual processes.

How, then, can a man distinguish between his own mental powers and the special gifts of God? The answer is that he cannot distinguish and he must not try, but while using them as his own powers he must remember that they *are* the gifts of God. The psychologist is right in interpreting all the feelings and desires and interior experiences of a man, including those of his spiritual consciousness, as mental processes. But the mystical soul is right also in accepting his peculiar spiritual powers and experiences, which he receives through faith and prayer, as being the revelation of a personal God. The powers are the powers of his mind, but God stimulates them, and no one knows more truly than the soul who receives them how completely they may be withheld and withdrawn, and sometimes lost altogether. The mystical soul is right in maintaining that prayer is more than auto-suggestion or telepathy, although no doubt the powers of auto-suggestion and telepathy are used; and he is right in believing that those interior messages which he is sometimes conscious of receiving in times of special illumination or crisis—if rightly received—are in substance if not in particular expression more than mere "uprushes" from his own subconscious mind.

SUPERNATURAL POWERS.—The increasing consciousness of his membership in "the Whole," which is union with God and

with his fellow-man, spells increasing power in the soul. Only by union with Him as a Person, only after the soul has humbly learnt that his spiritual power is after all not his own, but belongs to God, however much it may seem to be inherent in his own mind, only then is it safe for him to receive in any considerable measure those powers over material things and over the minds and bodies of other men that are, as a rule, called supernatural. These gifts, the power to work miracles and heal the sick, are not strictly speaking supernatural; they are more properly described as fully developed natural powers. They are the rightful inheritance of a perfected human nature, but they are rare because the bulk of humanity is not at present anywhere near perfection. If an average man were able to draw upon these powers before he had become filled with the knowledge and love of God and of His Will, and before he had been purified of selfish desire, it would probably mean that he would use them for selfish ends.

A few years ago a commission called by the Archbishop of Canterbury sat to investigate the phenomena of spiritual healing. The members were clergymen and doctors, learned and experienced, both in medicine and spiritual matters.

After examining all the most highly accredited spiritual healers, who were known to have wrought many indisputable cures by the laying on of hands, they found that, in their opinion, it was quite impossible to distinguish between the natural phenomenon known as animal magnetism and that spiritual and divine gift of God, belief in which the healers themselves firmly adhered to, and upon which they declared that their healing power entirely depended. This conclusion bears out the point I wish to emphasize. The means by which the cures were accomplished were physical, but the stimulus that excited the natural power came from the mind of the healer, in contact with the mind of the patient, and this stimulus was the gift of the Holy Spirit, called out by faith, and dependent upon a trust in the power of a personal and loving God.

Concerning the mechanism and "dynamics," as they are now called, of the mind, psychologists have made many interesting discoveries, but their study is psychology and not mysticism. Psychology is a materialistic abstraction, it is the scientific analysis of mental history and mental states. Mysticism considers the man as an organic unity, and is a study of his mind, his life, and his experience, in the light of his personal approach to a personal God. This approach certainly involves all sorts of mental states but is not confined to them.

By defining exactly which muscles contract and expand, and what bloodvessels are stimulated from the higher centres,

you may no doubt analyze the smile on the face of a lover as he meets his love, but a knowledge of muscles and bloodvessels will not help you far to understand lovers and their smiles. What you want is to understand the person who smiles as a person. To analyze the mental states of a mystic and then say that you know all about mysticism is as absurd as to say that a smile is no more than a matter of muscles and bloodvessels.

V.—THE GOAL OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

Mystics are always accused of introspection, therefore it will be well to emphasize here that the true man of God, the healthy soul, is not vastly concerned with the workings of his own mind or his own psychological mechanism. He is, indeed, often obliged by bitter experience to learn about it, but to him such things are secondary matters. He is not "out for" self-analysis or self-cultivation. He is in love with God: he seeks to know Him and to please Him and find His will and do it. True, in acquiring fresh powers of prayer, he must often pass through periods of interior darkness, doubt, and suffering, and these often cause him bewilderment and perplexity, but he dwells on them as little as possible, and looks always towards God for his peace. The essence of true holiness is to possess and be possessed with God. True humility and purity of heart consists as much as anything in self-forgetfulness, a sort of absence of self-consciousness, as much as an absence of self-seeking or self-regard.

DIRECTION.—There is always a tendency in an unhealthy or morbid soul to become introspective, tied up in its own states and feelings and temptations, but this is a morbid, not a normal state. A certain amount of self-knowledge is necessary for interior self-discipline and interior health; there is healthy and unhealthy spiritual experience; the mind of man is prone to self-deception, and it is hard and in fact impossible for any soul to diagnose its own diseases and entirely guide itself. To distinguish between true and false spiritual experience, to discern between what are the true "fruits of the Spirit" and what is self-deception, is the task of the spiritual director, and it is a very hard task. He must have some knowledge of psychology as well as knowledge and love of God. He must himself be a true and, if possible, advanced mystic, as well as a learned priest and a ruler of men. This combination is hard to find, but nevertheless no mystical soul is safe to advance far in the way without some such guide and helper to whom he can unburden

his difficulties without reserve, and bring up and out into the open what is so often half expressed and half realized or half conquered, below in the subconscious mind.

It is a matter of note that one of the great points of value in the Catholic Church above other Christian bodies is its tradition, both inherited and written, concerning the direction of interior souls, and the highly trained and experienced directors which from time to time it produces.

VOCATION AND TRAINING.—The essence and treasure of mystical experience is power in prayer. Now although this power is a gift, it is a gift that is won by hard work, and held and cultivated and increased by constant labour.

God's method in His natural creation, as in supernatural grace, is not to make something out of nothing, but to stimulate into movement and higher direction something that is already there. Therefore the development of spiritual experience and its flower in the life of contemplation and the power of prayer is partly a matter of vocation—that is to say, there are people with a distinct gift and tendency for prayer and meditation, who show early a great desire for it, and make progress in the early stages more rapidly than others. But it is also largely a matter of training, and the discernment of such gifted souls, and the training of them, is the task of the spiritual director.

GOD ONLY.—All saints are mystics, but all mystics are not saints. In so far as mysticism means the power to draw upon the deeper subconscious powers of the mind, it can be used for selfish ends as well as good. Rasputin, for instance, appears to have been undoubtedly a mystic, and hence his peculiar powers over others.

But apart from such glaring instances of the misuse of spiritual powers, spiritual experience, if it is looked on as an end in itself, instead of a means towards holiness, can lead to much harm.

The path of holiness is the progress by which a soul becomes more and more loosened from the bonds of selfish desire, and more and more united to and filled with the desire and power of the Holy Spirit, that is to say, the individual will, the "part," becomes merged into the will of God, the "whole," to which he belongs. This progress generally means a gradually increasing power of prayer, and this power is generally accompanied from time to time by the experience of God's beauty and God's love. It very frequently sets free other and fresh powers in the mind, a kind of clairvoyance, consisting of a peculiar perception of the life of nature, or the souls of others, and also frequently some knowledge of the future. Such mystical power of vision is a gift and a privilege for which to thank God, and it may be used

in the service of others, but at the same time, the point I wish here to emphasize is that such peculiar gifts must never be made an object of desire or an end in themselves. They must be taken as they come and kept so far as possible hidden from others, but never cultivated for the sake of the interest or pleasure that they bring.

The note of the spiritual life is "God only," its only aim is union with God, to do His will and know Him, "and Jesus Christ whom He hath sent." Souls may rejoice in interior illumination just as they may rejoice in human love or in the success of their work, but to seek unduly for consolations, and those manifestations and visitations of His love which He from time to time vouchsafes to encourage the soul, is a form of self-deception, and the importance of a certain strict detachment towards what may be called the luxuries of the interior life cannot be over-emphasized.

Thus it comes to pass that in the mystical way self-sacrifice comes not only at the beginning or at the end, but again and again all the way along. Selfish desire, after it has become detached from bad things, can attach itself to good things, and it is harder to give up a good thing, and harder to learn that one is called upon to give it up, than it is to give up a bad thing. Nevertheless spiritual progress means this very thing, and it involves giving up first the obviously bad for the good, then the good for the better, and then the better for the best, till the soul possesses and desires nothing but "God only."

VI.—RECORDS OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE

RECORDS OF SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCE.—Those who have most spiritual experience are the ones who speak least about it.

The manner and nature and content of God's dealings with the individual soul are a sealed book to all outsiders. The inner life of the soul, the knowledge of Himself that God reveals to the soul who loves Him, the way and manner of His guidance, the rare manifestations of His glory will always be one of the greatest treasures that humanity can possess, but, nevertheless, it is, and has always been, an incommunicable treasure. It can only be known by those to whom God sends it.

Poetry may attempt it, but ordinary language is inadequate to render the true value and full meaning of any intense experience either of great suffering or of great joy. Those who have been through some terrible time of physical or mental anguish always begin with "It was as if," etc.; "I can't describe it, but it was like," etc.; "I can only compare it to," etc.

Description can only take the form of metaphor or analogy. Most of all this is the case with the experience of God's revelation of Himself to the soul, and if in feeble and halting language such souls try to tell where they have been and what they have learnt, all they can do is to resort to pictures and analogies corresponding to something already known to their hearers in the outward life of the senses.

Nevertheless we do possess an account of these things. A good deal has been written by the Christian saints themselves, and much of great value and beauty is found in the written traditions concerning them. But beyond and above these, and far surpassing them as a revelation of God's dealings with the soul of man, are the histories and traditions of the holy men and women of the Old and New Testaments. The vivid simplicity of the language in which the characters and their experiences are portrayed far surpasses in sincerity and beauty all other records of the kind, and the spiritual grandeur of those souls who knew God, and the high quality of the kind of experience recorded, give to the Bible narratives, together with its books of prophecy, songs, and poems, a supreme value. Indeed, so much is this the case that all other examples of the world's religious literature are for ever cast into the shade.

Preserved for centuries in the traditions of a primitive people, and then hewn out in crude, almost childlike language, the figures of those giant souls still stand out clear before us. Abraham, shepherd and contemplative, with his angels and visions of the future, the vision and message following upon the surrender of his own will and the giving up of all that he held most precious. This is a typical mystical experience. Moses, civilized and educated in the highest culture that the world at that time could produce, and then called to his life's work, the leadership of an ignorant and oppressed tribe through a desert to a "promised land" whose existence he knew only through interior revelation. Led, guided, and continually inspired by an interior light to carry out this work, burnt with longing to fulfil it, but continually tempted and occasionally tormented by his charge, he found it to be, nevertheless, the means for the training and proving and illumination of his own soul, leading him further towards the personal knowledge of a personal God. Nowhere could be found a finer type of mystical development than the life-history of this great leader, who was surely one of God's greatest saints. Joseph, mocked at by his family as a "dreamer," the drama of whose life was the gradual justification and unfolding of the mystical visions of his boyhood. Elijah, hermit and contemplative, called from his solitude to warn a rebellious people, and witness to the truth of that per-

sonal God whom he knew and worshipped in the light and power of prayer.

It is abundantly clear that the minds who drew up the original writings only partly understood the spiritual characters whose acts and achievements they were recording; they recorded things only as they were able to hear and see them. Those, however, who have some first-hand knowledge of such things, can recognize in these primitive stories all the true marks of genuine spiritual life, and as records of God's dealings with men's souls there is nothing in these ancient narratives but what is true to human nature in its spiritual aspect, and, indeed, the accounts of the calls, illuminations, strivings, discouragements, persecutions, falls, sufferings, and conquests of these ancient adventurers in the spirit, give altogether a marvellously truthful rendering of all the well-known phases and features of mystical experience.

More especially is this so with the Book of Psalms. There the whole depth and range of the soul's emotions, its sufferings and its joys are outpoured. They have been engrafted into almost every Christian ceremony and liturgy, and such is the incomparable beauty of their poetical expression that they have become the voice of the Church's song throughout the ages.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.—It seems too bold and profane a thing to analyze the spiritual consciousness of our Lord Himself, yet nevertheless the Gospels are given to us largely that we may learn about this thing. They give us the portrait of His character, and it was this character that brought salvation to mankind, and His spiritual consciousness is inseparable from, in fact is the key to, His character. Though He was God our Saviour, He was also a perfect man, and His soul worked as the soul of a man works. All that humanity can ever accomplish in its search for union with God He accomplished; all that humanity suffers in its search for union with God He suffered. Although He was "very God of very God," that does not mean that He accomplished this union with God without an effort. It is important to remember this in gaining a true knowledge of His work of salvation for us. He explained in words little or nothing of the mystery of human existence. What He did was to show us the way by accomplishing a human life in perfection.

When the divine Son took upon Himself a human body He brought to a concrete perfection the whole material creation. Nature is an organic whole; you cannot separate one man's body from the time system which brought it into being. You cannot separate Christ's body from the whole unfolding process of the material universe. Taken thus, the whole creation is seen as the body and vehicle for the expression of divine Life.

We can put it in another way. That which as divinity is and was in the beginning and the end for all Eternity, was expressed, by being wrought out as a gradual development in terms of finite time, and limited locality, through the humanity of the Man Jesus, in a body of flesh upon this earth. The divinity that was His did not save Him from the gradual development of the human soul, but it brought about "once for all" its complete and perfect accomplishment.

Therefore all the experiences of Christ and His works are the experiences and works of perfect man. Because He was divine all humanity is gathered into His humanity, because He was human He lived out His single experience as a single individual. His miracles and mighty works show what the human mind, when perfected, can accomplish in its power over matter, but His miracles do not differ much in character from the miracles of the Saints, and He himself promised that His followers should do the same and "greater works than these."

His human character and human personality, therefore, were the method of salvation, and through His divinity His personality is conveyed to us. His warfare over self, and finally the conquest at last accomplished in Gethsemane and paid for by the cross, is not only the conscious inspiration and example, but the potential inheritance of all humanity.

I am aware that I cannot possibly in these few lines have made clear the theory of the interrelation of Time-space and universality, as being the interrelation of the divine and human nature in the Person of Christ, but although the conception is obscure, it is impossible to make any critique upon the spiritual experience of our Lord without allusion to it. It is only possible to sum it up by saying that although we cannot define Divinity it is hard to conceive of it except as universal personality. By the possession of the divine nature Christ's human spiritual conquest became the conquest that has been accomplished and can be drawn upon and appropriated, by all men for all time, who are willing to respond to it. His humanity is what did it, His divinity is what conveys it to all of us.

The Gospels give very few glimpses of our Lord's own interior spiritual life—of His times of prayer and vision and spiritual conflict. Like all the great saints, He kept these things hidden. But the few episodes that are recorded were not stray glimpses caught by stray onlookers by chance; they seem to have been specially chosen and definitely revealed by Him to His disciples, with a purpose.

In the Temptation He was alone in the wilderness wrestling with His own consciousness against evil or delusive suggestions as to the proper use of His extraordinary powers, and the true

meaning of His Messiahship, but the account of these things could only have been related by Himself to His disciples because it was intended that they, and posterity through them, should know of it. Although this experience is said to have lasted for only forty days, it cannot be supposed that His doubts and self-questionings ended when He left the wilderness and came back to Galilee. But the episode recorded gathers up, and is representative of, the strivings with Himself that must have haunted Him from time to time all through His life, and is one of the most illuminating episodes in His life for us, and pregnant with teaching and significance.

It was so also with the great event described by the Church as the "Transfiguration." As a rule He withdrew by Himself for nights of prayer and periods of intercourse with God, but this time He deliberately took with Him Peter and James and John, knowing what was about to happen and intending that they should be witnesses of it.

The vision of the transcendent glory of the Father must have visited Him more than once, but this occasion—like the temptation—is a "gathering up" of this aspect of His character, a supreme example of the sublime illumination of his spiritual consciousness, so that the incident may become the focus, as it were, for our meditations.

What happened upon that mountain? What can we say? What do we know? When the evangelists say "His countenance became altered and His garment dazzling white as snow," it is but a feeble attempt to describe in words the intense radiance that appeared to surround and envelop Him. All we can guess is that the bars and the imprisoning limits of time and space melted, and He was caught up into union with the infinite and eternal glory, into the presence and vision of God.

The presence with Him of the two great visionaries of the Old Testament, Moses and Elijah, seems to emphasize in a picture for us His union with them in the mystical body of glorified humanity, that we call "the Communion of Saints."

This great experience of our Lord, though greater in degree, is of the same quality as that often described in the lives of the great saints as Ecstasy, and in a dimmer form, limited by their sinful humanity, has been shared by a great company of holy souls, who by union with the Person of Christ have been given a share in His transcendent consciousness of God. What happens to the mind of man on such great visitations is beyond all human knowledge to define. The Church has never laid down any dogmas about the nature of the human soul (although it has defined so much concerning the doctrine of the Person of Christ, and we cannot think of one without the other), nor has it

tried to teach us the mystery of how the spark of the indwelling Spirit which is "us," and dwells within us, can be breathed upon and made to glow by contact with the breath of that divine Spirit which is "not us" and "without us," so that the human consciousness becomes illuminated with a supernatural power and receives a knowledge and vision of the divine. Yet this is what happens on certain great occasions to purified souls who have been made fit to receive it. They themselves cannot explain it or communicate it to us. St. Francis of Assisi, at the moment of his supreme illumination on Monte La Verna, was heard to ask, "O God, O God, who art thou?" And then after a silence, "And who am I?" But the answer to these ultimate mysteries, that have always haunted the imagination of man but baffled his intelligence, must remain a secret. What more can we do than take our place humbly beside those ignorant but adoring disciples who saw and worshipped, but could not understand, and say with them, "Master, it is good for us to be here"?

EVA O'MALLEY.

THE INCARNATION AND SPACE-TIME

THERE is probably no theological problem more difficult of ultimate solution than that of the relation between the divine and human natures of our Lord. Indeed, almost the only statement that can be confidently made about it is that any solution that professed to be entirely complete must be faulty, since the mode of existence of God is something entirely beyond our power of adequate imagination. Nevertheless the defence of the Catholic dogma that Christ is True God and True Man is an imperative obligation, and it is the duty of Christians in every age to expound it and maintain it in terms of the prevailing categories of thought.

Many modern attempts to grapple with the problem have either been frankly adoptionistic or else have viewed the Incarnation as virtually a modification of the mode of existence of God, as a withdrawal of the activity of the Divine Logos from the heavenly realm into the earthly, and are consequently almost equivalent to the assertion that, during His life on earth, the divine nature of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity was temporarily suspended. For the Catholic, of course, any such theory is impossible.

> "A babe on the breast of a Maiden He lies,
> But reigns with His Father on high in the skies,
> Before Him their faces the Cherubim hide,
> While Joseph stands waiting, unscared, by His side."

Nor is it only the tradition of Christendom that is against these theories. It is profoundly difficult, for philosophical reasons, to accept any such change in the mode of existence of God as they seem to involve. It has not, however, always been clear how, in view of current ideas, the traditional belief of the Church on this point is to be defended.

Perhaps the most profound contribution of late years, if we except Fr. Thornton's quite recent great work, *The Incarnate Lord*, has been Bishop Weston's book, *The One Christ*. Bishop Weston maintained that at the Incarnation the Divine Logos did not divest Himself of the attributes of His divine nature to become man, but rather that, by imposing upon Himself a law of self-restraint, He added to His divine attributes a complete set of human relationships, so that, while still sharing in the life of the Holy Trinity, He became also the Subject of a perfect human life. In His human nature He is limited by the conditions of human existence, although, since in Him that nature is borne by God Himself, it is not marred by the imperfections that are found in us, but exhibits the utmost possible perfection that is compatible with its human quality. At the same time the Logos continues in His divine nature to participate as God in the eternal social life of the Holy Trinity and to manifest His creative activity towards the world.*

It must be admitted that this view is far more in accordance both with the evidence of the New Testament and with the historic experience of the Christian community than are most of the kenotic theories, but it is not without its difficulties. In the first place, how can the Person of the Divine Logos be the Subject of two separate modes of existence? Does not Bishop Weston's view destroy the unity of the individual? Again, while he explicitly and successfully repudiates the suggestion that, in the Incarnation, the Logos is divested in any way of His divine attributes, he asserts that a set of human attributes is added to them. May it not be argued that it is just as difficult to imagine the changeless Deity adding to His functions as it is to imagine Him discarding some of them?†

These are two objections to which a satisfactory answer must be given if the Incarnation is to be put upon a thoroughly rational basis.

First of all, then, is it possible to consider the Divine Logos to be the Subject of two separate modes of existence? I believe that this objection rests upon a misapprehension of the variety of types of personal existence that are ontologically possible,

* This is, of course, a very incomplete statement of Bishop Weston's Christology.

† These two questions also arise with regard to the Christologies of Bishop Gore and of the Archbishop of York, though perhaps less acutely in the latter case.

and upon an exaggeration of the power of the human imagination. We have really no reason to suppose that it is impossible for a personal Ego to be the subject of a more complex mode of existence than our own. What we may, however, unhesitatingly assert is that, if a more complex mode of existence is possible, we can never hope to envisage it in its fullness. If there is anything for which the human mind may be expected to be, by its nature, inadequate, it is the task of completely understanding a personal consciousness of a higher type than its own. How far, for instance, can a child form an adequate image of the mental processes of a man, or the ordinary man of the mental processes of a great poet or scientist? And there is far less difference between a child and a man than there is between a man and God. Indeed, it is only because we believe that God has made us in His own image and has revealed Himself to us in Christ, that we have any ground for supposing that we can understand in even the slightest degree the mystery of the Being of God. In any case, it is a very crude anthropomorphism to assert that God is capable of no higher mode of personal existence than that with which He has endowed us.

We may, then, I think, say that we have no solid ground for denying *a priori* that the Person of the Divine Logos could, without His individuality being impaired, be the Subject of two natures. To use for a moment the terminology of the *Quicunque Vult*, we can maintain the unity of Person without confusing the substances. It is thus necessary to use the greatest caution when we ascribe to our Lord such human experiences as disappointment, suffering, temptation, and so on. They are real experiences of His—we cannot too strongly emphasize this—but they are experienced by the Divine Logos *in His human nature*. The habit of many present-day writers, of describing the human relationships of Jesus of Nazareth as though they were all the relationships of which the Logos while He was incarnate was the Subject, goes far towards a denial of His Godhead. It is only by maintaining firmly the dual relation in which the Divine Logos stands that we can assert at the same time both that Christ was True God and that He was True Man.

This leads on to the second objection.

If we are to view the Incarnation as the assumption by the Logos of a complete set of human relationships, which He added to the Divine relationships through which He shares in the eternal life of the Holy Trinity, are we not in effect postulating an addition to the mode of existence of God which is incompatible with His eternal changelessness? This is the crux of the whole matter, and it can only be resolved by a thorough

consideration of the nature of the time-process in which the created Universe subsists.

It is therefore gratifying, in view of the many problems that science has raised for religion in the past, to find that the philosophical position to which, on purely physical grounds, scientists have been recently led, provides, if not a solution of the problem (for this we cannot expect), at any rate an indication as to where the solution lies. Relativity and the Quantum theory have made it more than ever clear that time and space are modes rather than objects of our experience. The Universe as presented to us created beings is simply the aggregate of the experiences of us all, and the theory of Relativity claims to provide a systematic ordering of these experiences. To do this it postulates a space-time structure which is independent of individual experients and into which the spatial and temporal experiences of all experients can be fitted, but space *as such* and time *as such* are not inherent in the structure. They are derived from the structure by the experient in the act of experience.

Since, then, God is the Creator of the Universe, He does not, apart from the Incarnation, exist in the space-time order. He is antecedent to it, not temporally (for it is meaningless to talk of anything being temporally antecedent to time), but causally, since all temporal and spatial experience is due to His volition. In Professor Whitehead's words, "God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality."* We may say that God is "outside" space or "before" time, but both these terms are metaphors and can validly connote only causal antecedence.

When we are faced with the question as to what God was doing before He created the world, we therefore need not give the famous reply that He was making a hell for the inquisitive. Such questions rely for their apparent relevance on the fact that all the tenses of our verbs imply a time at which the action that they stand for occurs; whereas the act of creation is not, in fact, an act occurring in time at all, but is the extra-temporal act of divine volition to which the temporal experience of all created minds is due. It is perfectly true to say that God is "everlasting," and that He is "omnipresent," but it must be remembered that in using these words we are describing Him, not in terms of His own divine essence, but in terms of the categories of space and time under which, in virtue of His will, we experience Him. To avoid confusion, it will be best to describe God as "eternal" when we wish to assert that He is causally antecedent to the space-time process, and as "everlasting" when we wish to assert that, from the standpoint of

* *Science and the Modern World*, p. 222.

a creature within that process, He has always existed and will always exist.

God thus appears in a character of the utmost transcendence, transcending the spatio-temporal structure of the Universe itself. Nevertheless, since every element of every experience depends for its actuality upon the divine will, the Universe is indwelt through and through by God. God is immanent in the Universe in the sense that in every detail it is sustained in existence by Him; not in the sense that, in His eternal Being, He is in any way conditioned by it.

From this standpoint, then, there is no problem as to how the Divine Logos continued His life in the Holy Trinity during the time when He was incarnate on earth. At the Incarnation we see Him add to His timeless and spaceless existence in the bosom of the Eternal Father a complete and perfect human life under the conditions of space and time, but this appears to us as an *addition* to His functions solely because we view it from within the space-time order. From the standpoint of His divinity, from "outside" space-time, He is the Subject in His divine nature of all the spaceless and timeless relations involved in His Godhead as the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, and is also the Subject in His human nature of the whole fabric of spatio-temporal relations involved in His manhood as the Son of Mary. It must be emphasized again that the Incarnation is not in any way fictitious or illusory. It is in the fullest sense real and objective, for the whole spatio-temporal fabric of His human relationships is eternally present to the Divine Logos; but it is only when viewed from within the space-time process, from the standpoint of the human nature, that the Incarnation appears as an addition made *in time* to His functions. The eternal awareness of His whole human life, which the Logos has in His divine nature (and which is not to be confused with His temporal experience of that life which He has in His human nature), cannot be likened to either our anticipation, or our present consciousness, or our memory of an event. It is something entirely unrealizable by us, except conceptually; but it is something that we are driven to postulate by our intuition of the changelessness of God.

This view of God as transcending the space-time order of the Universe does not, however, mean that there may not be in the divine nature itself some relation of ordered succession analogous to what we call "time." Indeed, when we consider that, on the Christian claim, God is in His essence a God of love and of creative activity, and that acts of love and of creation essentially involve a persisting rational will, it seems difficult to consider the divine nature as entirely untemporal. Unless we

are to limit love and creative activity to Christ's human nature alone, we must surely suppose that some kind of quasi-temporal experience is part of the nature of God. But we must observe that this, which I will call the "divine time," is not in any way part of the spatio-temporal order of the created Universe. It is the time in which there occurs the continual concretion* of the created space-time order of the Universe, and in which the whole created space-time order is eternally present to God. This divine time is quite external and transcendent to the time of our experience. It is an attribute of God, while the time of our experience is a creature.†

The overwhelming importance of the Incarnation for us thus appears with increased force. Even if we leave out of account all the benefits we have received through the Atonement, we see that it is only through the human nature of Christ, which partakes of the space-time order, that we, living under the conditions of space and time, can be brought into contact with God, whose eternal existence is antecedent to those conditions and independent of them. "No man cometh unto the Father but by Me." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."

There is one possible objection that I think should be considered here. It has been asserted above that the whole space-time order is eternally present to the divine nature of the Logos in His eternal awareness of His human nature. Does this necessitate a deterministic philosophy and the denial of human freedom? I can see no reason why it should. It has been pointed out that the eternal awareness by the Logos of His human nature is by no means the same as either our anticipations or our memories. He sees the space-time process neither as past nor as future but *as a whole*, and the relations of determinacy and contingency, which are real relations of the space-time order relatively to an individual within that order, have no significance relatively to the eternal standpoint of God.

There is one more point that I wish to mention in view of the gross misunderstanding that appears to exist as to the belief of Catholics about it. This is the question as to what is the state of our Lord's humanity after the Ascension. The Dean of St. Paul's has demanded‡ that Christian people shall bring their views of heaven into line with the Copernican cosmogony and quotes, evidently with amusement, the statement of an orthodox theologian who "believed in a local heaven, only not above our

* *I.e.*, the maintaining in existence by the divine will.

† I am indebted to the Master of Corpus for the remark which led to the writing of this paragraph.

‡ In his concluding essay in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, pp. 356 sqq.

heads." As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether the conception of heaven as local is felt by very many Catholics to be a necessary dogma of the Faith—St. Jerome, for instance, denied it*—but it is interesting to observe that there is nothing in the views of modern science to conflict with it. Since Relativity has rejected the idea that the Universe is an infinite flat continuum, there is nothing to prevent anyone, if he wishes it, from believing that there exist regions of experience of a nature more or less analogous to our spatio-temporal universe, but having no spatial connection with it. Such a heaven would certainly be local in the sense of having spatial extension, and would equally certainly not be above our heads. Whether, however, we consider the ascended humanity of our Lord to exist still under quasi-spatial conditions or not, there is plainly no means by which He could have impressed upon the Apostles so deeply the fact that His withdrawal from them did not involve the destruction of His humanity, as by a physical ascension and reception by a cloud. As to what actually happened in the cloud, reverence and common sense alike demand that we should confess our utter ignorance. We must observe, however, that, since our Lord's humanity, although glorified, is still humanity, it cannot be entirely divorced from the spatio-temporal order of the created Universe. However greatly it is freed from the operation of the laws that govern our own bodies, it is still so far within the created order as to mediate the divine life to us in the Blessed Sacrament of the Altar. The view which I think we are compelled to hold of the divine humanity when we look at it from within the space-time order is this. We see it constituted at the Incarnation in the Holy Child, and undergoing in the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth all the experiences of humanity. At the Resurrection it is freed from many of the laws which ordinarily control human individuals, as is plainly shown in the Gospel narratives. At the Ascension it is withdrawn from the sphere of sensible experience, but still continues in the created order and is locally manifested in the Consecrated Elements in the Holy Eucharist, in which it is objectively present as our sacrifice and as our food. Finally, it will be by union with the divine humanity that the souls of Christians made perfect will enter with the Mother of God and all the Saints into the enjoyment of the Beatific Vision.

In conclusion, let us consider very shortly how far such a view as I have outlined above may lay claim to any degree of acceptance. It cannot be stressed too strongly that no attempt is made to prove any dogma of the Faith from the tenets of modern scientific philosophy. Mr. J. B. S. Haldane has said

* *Vide, e.g.*, Gore, *Jesus of Nazareth*, p. 228.

that "'a creed in harmony with the thought of today' is no better than the Athanasian Creed if it is taken as a creed and not as a working hypothesis, for the simple reason that it will not be in harmony with the thought of tomorrow,"* and, without accepting Mr. Haldane's estimate of the Athanasian Creed, one may well agree with him that mere modernity is no test of religious truth. In a truly Christian world we should not test the truth of our religion by our philosophy, but rather that of our philosophy by our religion, and this is indeed just what the practising Catholic does in his daily life. But when a certain philosophical outlook has been so successful in the co-ordination of a large group of phenomena as to make it probable that it will endure for a long time, it is worth while to examine whether it forms a suitable medium for the expression of the Faith, for if so it will be possible to expound the Faith in terms that are familiar to contemporary thought. Again, a great advance in any sphere of knowledge must almost inevitably bring both explanations and new problems into the sphere of theology, and it is a positive duty to accept any assistance that science can give us towards the deeper understanding of the mysteries of our religion. With regard to the attempt that I have made to examine the bearings of the modern view of space-time upon the Incarnation, this much may be said. It has not been found necessary to deny or to weaken in the slightest degree the Catholic dogma that Christ is True God and True Man. The philosophical standpoint from which we set out has shown itself to be not in the least opposed to the belief which is the very heart of Christian devotion. On the other hand, it has enabled us to find at least the suggestion of a solution of the problem as to the relation between the two natures of Christ. And when a philosophical outlook has shown itself to be not only in harmony with the belief of the Church, but also to resolve some of its difficulties, may it not be claimed that such an outlook is capable of forming a sound basis for an apologetic which shall be both true to Catholic tradition and commendable to present-day thought?

E. L. MASCALL.

ANGELS

A SUBJECT of perennial interest and unfailing fascination for all believers in God is the influence of angels on human life. Many and various are the ideas held about these angelic creatures who, according to revelation, hover over our life with a loving

* *Possible Worlds*, p. 219.

concern from the cradle to the grave, convey our souls to Paradise, and welcome us to the new scenes and the old Saints of the Blessed. The Scriptures must be here our guide. Some pray to them, and worship them, contrary to the Scriptures. "See thou do it not, for I am thy fellow-servant . . . worship God" (Rev. xix. 10, xxii. 9). St. Paul warned the Colossians against the worship of angels.* Some ignore them, contrary to the Scriptures, for angels are represented as concerned in all the scenes in the drama of man's creation, fall, and restoration, from Genesis to Revelation, from the Cherubim that kept the way of the Tree of Life to Michael contending with and conquering Satan. The ministration of angels is a special feature of human life, as described in the sacred pages. However detached and impersonal their manner may seem in the Old Testament, in the Revelation it is more human, more personal. "I am thy fellow-servant and of those who have the testimony of Jesus." If our Lord and Saviour, the Head of the heavenly hierarchy, accepted their ministrations in the wilderness, in Gethsemane, and doubtless at other times, He must have needed them. Do we not need them more? And if they were given to Him, why should they not be given to us? If evil spirits, as we know, have the power of influencing us to do wrong, why should not the Heavenly Father counteract their influence over us by the good suggestions of His angels?

In His own day Christ delivered men from the power of evil demons who had a sinister power over their lives. There is no reason a believer can see why He cannot now send His angels to us to suggest things to us about helping others, and to others about helping us.

At times we cannot distinguish these suggestions from our own thoughts. In the *Pilgrim's Progress* Christian was greatly perplexed because in one desperate adventure he failed to distinguish the base suggestions of the fiends from the very thoughts of his own mind. "I took notice that now poor Christian was so confounded that he did not know his own voice; and thus I perceived it. Just when he was come over against the mouth of the burning pit, one of the wicked ones got behind him and stept up softly to him and whisperingly suggested many grievous blasphemies to him which he verily thought had proceeded from his own brain" (p. 78).

Now if we can with difficulty distinguish at times our own thoughts from the thoughts suggested by such hostile agents, it would follow analogously that we can hardly distinguish the good suggestions of friendly beings of a higher sphere of life from our own. In a practical way we might strike an average by

* Col. ii. 18.

referring all selfish and impure thoughts to an evil centre, and by regarding every good idea and intention, not merely when "a great thought strikes the brain and runs along the cheek," but also when a good thought comes to us, as the whisper of a benign spirit. We have every reason to believe that evil angels are working among mankind in order to pervert to wrong purposes and uses the sacred gifts of body and soul God has bestowed upon men and women, because it seems that without such diabolical instigation the unaided mind of man would never have thought of some of the awful horrors that have been perpetrated recently, for example, in Russia. Why should there not be some means of counteracting that unholy influence? Has the Almighty not sufficient resources to cope with those of the enemy of mankind? Or is His love limited, as some consider His power to be? But that were unthinkable.

The angels who feel joy over the sinner that repenteth, who delight to help us in this world, are ever ready when the call comes for help. Many things happened in the Great War that were regarded then, by those interested, as due to angelic ministration. A brother clergyman told me of a woman who had to undergo a severe operation which she dreaded. But at the moment the ordeal began she felt her hand gripped by another hand that gave her the needed courage and strength. This happened three times. And she came out of her trouble safe and sound. Her belief was that it was Christ who helped her. He may have sent one of His angels to her assistance. We have often been led to some good deed, brought to the very spot where our help was needed. Shall we say that it was "just chance" when a drowning man is seen from a bank or bridge by a man who can dive and swim, and has the courage and unselfishness to risk his life and health in an effort to save a fellow-man? These "just chances" are so numerous that they can be gathered up into a class of inexplicable coincidences which by reason of their repeated occurrences resemble a general law. People never pause to ask, Who brought that man to bank or bridge at the psychological moment, and who made him jump off the parapet into the river? Or who made two boys in a mine rush off to warn their comrades of the disaster? Or what impelled a master of hounds to risk his own life trying to save his hounds, who had crossed the line in full cry in front of an approaching train? In our Lord's Parable of the Good Samaritan, doubtless founded upon fact, what was it brought the kindly doctor to the wounded man? Was it "just chance"? It is a striking fact that only here, in the Bible, have we the expression "by chance." But the Greek means "by a *coincidence*" (*κατὰ συγκυρίαν*, Luke x. 31). As Godet said: "It is certainly not by

chance that the narrator brings these two personages together in the scene." The idea of chance was foreign to the ancient Jew as it is to the modern scientist. If the reign of law renders chance impossible for the scientist, the Hebrew believed that God really guided everything that appeared to be chance. "The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord" (Prov. xvi. 33).

It is hard to collect evidence on such a subject from others, as English people are reticent and reserved in such matters; but we know in our own lives that a great many things have happened which we might have been inclined at the moment to put down to a stroke of luck or chance, but after time and reflection, and comparison with similar occurrences, we came to regard them as providential interventions or angelic ministrations, and not fortuitous happenings. And is it not true that when we look back upon our life all things seem to be part of one great plan that is being fulfilled slowly but surely in our lives? When a number of things apparently casual and unconnected in our life's experience are set down, if they do not form part of a series, they at all events are woven through our life like a crossword puzzle, and instead of looking on them as a chapter of happy chances, we would be wiser to regard them as divinely arranged events to which we offered no opposition at the time, and in which we may consequently discern the "finger of God" working through His angels. But it is only when we sit down in a calm hour seriously to reflect upon our experiences that we are able to remember how one thing has fitted into and in with another, and consequently begin tardily to recognize this Divine leading. We see it for ourselves and by ourselves and therefore keep it to ourselves. We may think it too sacred to mention to a third person, or other persons may be involved so that the secret belongs to them also, and may not be honourably divulged without their consent, and so the secret dies with us, at least it passes with us into Paradise. This is what happens in nearly every case. Sometimes a man will relate his own experiences, but will hedge round the most sacred and wonderful of these partly through his own natural reserve, partly for fear of ridicule, and sometimes because of reverence. He feels that it is enough for himself to know and appreciate the fact that invisible helpers have been sent to his aid.

Invisible helpers, yes, or angels, whatever we like to call them. The universe is full of them. When a man passes who has lived a life of kindness and help—who has delighted to be of use to the poor, or his own people—he enters Paradise with the same desire to help and be of service. It is with his character, the strongest expression and clearest utterance of

his innermost being, that he passes into the next life. When he becomes conscious of himself after the great change, he naturally begins to think of his work and the people who leaned on his help. Surely he cannot forget them. Love is eternal. To help people begets and wins love, as Aristotle shows. And to know that people still need us, and that we can do nothing for them, and that no one else knows as we do their circumstances or their needs, would make Paradise a sorrowful place, unless we could move others to go to their assistance. And who can say or prove that this is impossible? "All things are possible with God." Our Lord could have called upon legions of angels to assist Him at one crisis in His life, and at other times He accepted their ministrations. Why should He not allow a man to return for a moment to help another out of a difficulty, to reveal something that was absolutely essential for his well-being; to give him the one test he desired of immortality? To make long lamentation over a friend who has passed is no help to him or her at all. In fact, it may keep them back from their progress. We cannot tell. But we cannot believe—at least, we who are Christians—that the only immortality they enjoy is such memory of friends made holier by their lives. And we also cannot believe that those who have prayed for us here, our fathers and mothers, for example, will cease to want to pray for us in another life. Accordingly, our reason is on the side of the angels.

We cannot see how the belief in these angelic offices interferes with the belief in the all-pervading and all-powerful Spirit of God. A modern writer (Dr. Fosdick) says, "Angels represent our Father's profound and practical consciousness of the reality, friendliness, and availability of the spiritual world." "See how naturally the sense of the Spirit's reality, nearness, and availability pours itself out in terms of angels." "The underlying vital truth in angelology is the presence, providence, directing care, and constant availability of that unseen friendship whose source is in God." And he concludes: "I believe in the nearness and friendship of the Divine Spirit, but I don't think of that experience in terms of individual angels."* Our answer is that we, too, believe in the nearness, availability and friendship of the Divine Spirit of God, omnipresent and omnipotent, but we are entitled to employ the reason the same Divine Spirit gave us, and to argue from the known to the unknown, from what we experience every day of our lives. Now the kind offices of our friends and relatives, the people with whom we have to do most in this life, form a large portion of that experience, and we sometimes have the grace to thank God for such kind offices,

* *Modern Use of the Bible*, pp. 127-29.

knowing that it is from His Holy Spirit that "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed." It is that Spirit that was the prime mover in the kind offices of our friends. He made them think of doing them. He is the original source and mainspring of all things good and beautiful, friendly and kind in their life. To regard that Divine Spirit as working through the instrumentality of human beings here and now does not interfere with our belief in His all-prevailing and all-powerful presence. We cannot, therefore, understand how His working through the instrumentality of such beings while in an advanced stage of their spirituality, in the next life, could be regarded as an interference with the belief in His omnipotence and omnipresence. He mediates His divine help through specially appointed and qualified messengers, which in Greek is "angels." It was not superstition nor imagination, but reason, both in intuition and inference, that has kept alive this belief in the ministry of angels for so many centuries.* The spiritual world is around us, closer than breathing; its powers and gifts are available for us; its friendliness is a constant and potent factor in our lives.

We experience the love and goodness of that benign Power and Presence that surrounds our life. We also believe in His wisdom, His regulating and providing reason, that administers the universe of things and beings. And if energy in this world cannot be destroyed, though it is transformed, the energy of moral and spiritual life possessed by those who have left us for other scenes cannot be destroyed; it has passed into other forms of energy which must find a vent in action. And as God's system all through is ordered and orderly progress, there must be an upward and onward development of the spirits that have passed. Work must be given to them, congenial work for which they have been duly prepared and upon which they will employ that energy that can never be lost. And if that work has to do with mediating such spiritual help to human souls in sadness or sin, which it was their greatest happiness when living on earth to administer, we fail to see how such an occupation, when they have passed out of sight, can interfere with another's sense of the nearness and availability and friendship of God. Why, it is bound to intensify and increase such consciousness, just as the labours of such men did in this world. The kind actions and ministrations of godly men and women in this life redound to the credit of the Divine Spirit, who inspired them.

* This belief was doubtless assisted by the remarkable work, the *Celestial Hierarchy* of the pseudo-Dionysius, translated by Scotus Erigena in the tenth century. Although exceedingly fanciful, it is based on the nine orders mentioned in the New Testament.

They do not interfere with belief in Him. Nay, they are quoted as proofs of His existence and His power. When a friend said to the dying Maurice, "You have preached your last sermon in this life," the answer of the passing spirit was, "Aye, but only my last in this life." He believed in the continuation of his ministry under more spiritual conditions. How much more efficient would such a service be, when the "soul" of the message could be given without dependence upon that body or form that often, and sometimes because of its beauty and charm, obscures and interferes with the working of that "soul" in the hearts of the hearers, and so prevents them from realizing "the availability of the spiritual world" in the spoken word! How much more effectively would the "soul" of that message, when purified of its earthly pomposity, influence the hearers and convince them of the reality and nearness and availability of the loving and living Spirit of God!

We are not bound, therefore, to regard the angels of God as "metaphorical expressions of the nearness of the spiritual world," which is ever bursting through the physical in order to prevent the belief in their existence interfering with our belief in the Omnipresent Spirit of God. Because this tendency is found among ignorant people, who are more inclined to invoke the assistance of semi-human beings than the assistance of God Himself, there is no reason why thoughtful people, who are conscious of the immense difference between God and His angels, should follow such a tendency. Our outlook on life and the universe would be poorer without this theory of angels, the messengers of God with whom the spiritual world is peopled. "Fellow-servants of ours and of all those who have the testimony of Jesus" (Rev. xix. 10); they do not claim our worship, they bid us worship God, they testify to Christ. They cannot come between us and God. But it can be easily conceived that they might be thought to do so in the case of unthinking and uneducated people, who even allow their priests to come between them and God. But for the educated and thoughtful neither danger exists. We should, however, feel lonelier without such ministers of God, even though we feel no need of their ministration, but regard our Christ and His spirits as all-sufficient for our every want. In fact, many intellectual people as well as ignorant people never think about them at all. "Everywhere in the old Jewish world, they are next to nowhere in our world. They have practically disappeared from the universe in thought and fact,"* said one writer. Another declared there was no room in the system of Jesus Christ for such personal intermediate beings,† and that the holy angels that are to accompany

* Bruce, *Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 45. † Beyschlag, *New Testament Theology*, i. 86 f.

Him at His Advent in glory are "the rays of the Divine Majesty which is then to surround Him with splendour." Others believe in them, but only theoretically. They admit their existence, but do not allow that belief to influence their lives. They do not actually disbelieve in them or in their ministry, for they cannot do so without rejecting the unquestioned sayings of our Lord and His Apostles, but their belief is purely formal or poetic.* They wish to communicate with God directly without any intermediary. But such ministers of God are not intermediaries. We do not approach God through them.† For Christ is the Christian's only mediator or go-between. Yet we all may feel the force of such an argument. For anything that comes between us and Christ and the Spirit must be set aside, but the thought of angels does not, of logical necessity, have this effect. It rather makes us realize the immensity of His power, the magnitude of His domain.

When our Lord spoke of them we cannot imagine that He was using metaphorical language to describe the nearness and concern of God in human affairs. Neither can we think that He was accommodating His teaching about God to the opinions of the people, who believed in the ministry of angels, when He referred to angels. To hold that He had only a didactic purpose in such references, that He only employed them for educational purposes as the kindergarten toys and figures are used in the infant schools, would not fit in with His general plan of putting new wine into new bottles. He would not hesitate to discard such a belief along with the traditions of the elders which most Jews believed in and followed, if He thought fit. To adopt what He knew was unreal in order to adapt Himself to the knowledge and opinions of His fellow-countrymen was not like the action of One who said, "If it were not so, I would have told you" (John xiv. 2), and allowed His disciples to break the traditions of the Sabbath. We cannot think that He refrained from "correcting the Jewish ideas on this subject because He had more important work to do,"‡ for His language certainly in His controversy with the Sadducees, who did not believe in angels, reaches the level of positive teaching about them. He did speak about angels at times as if He actually believed in their real existence.

Of course, the view one takes of angels depends largely on the view one has of God and the world. The Pantheist who is convinced that God is immanent in the world, that His spirit

* Article, Hastings, *D.C.G.*, "Angels?"

† Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.*, ii., 32, 4: "nec invocationibus angelicis facit (ecclesia) aliquid . . . sed munde et pure et manifeste orationes dirigens ad Dominum."

‡ J. R. Willis, art. "Accommodation," Hastings, *D.C.G.* (p. 20).

is everywhere, has no place for angels in his system of life. While the rationalist regards them as an illusion, the mystic considers them an intrusion. And the man who has won his faith in God after an intense and incessant struggle of years does not desire any addition to his creed, but falls back upon the logical law of parsimony that he need not believe in what he does not believe he needs.

Another writer contends that a true science welcomes the belief in angels as intervening between man and God. "It is surely not unscientific to assume the existence of the pure and mighty beings spoken of by seers and prophets of the olden time."* The lesson of the unapproachableness of God is given in the Scriptures by revealing Him surrounded by these beings, higher and greater and purer than any human soul, and by exposing them as imperfect and ignorant in comparison with the holiness and wisdom of God. Beings greater and purer and wiser than man—why should such not exist? The great brain of Aristotle† reasoned thus, that "if man is superior to all other living beings, there are other living beings much more divine than man." And it has been argued that the belief in the existence of such beings "much more divine than man" is encouraged, not contradicted, by the modern law of evolution, for if life has risen to the human stage, there is no limit to its rise or attainments.‡ It may rise to a superhuman stage, and the science which builds up its system in gradations in the past, must logically anticipate such a development in the future, as is indeed suggested by the scriptural order of creation. The great Aristotle helps us to answer another argument against angels, that they are only the dreams and phantasies of men, "for the dreams and phantasies of the good," he says, "are better than those of ordinary people."§

Accordingly, we may say that we have answered many arguments against belief in the existence of angels; and also have put forward many arguments for a belief in their existence.

In conclusion, much of the poetry of life would be lost as well as its comradeship if we leave angels altogether out of our system of life and thought. There is more to be said for their existence than the learned ones who reject their ministry realize. They are not Divine in the sense that God is Divine. But as His messengers, who perform His will without murmur,

* F. G. Selby, *The Imperfect Angel*. † *Eth. Nic.*, vi., 7.

‡ Sir Oliver Lodge: "Humanity is as yet but little risen above the animals, and what it has already accomplished is but a trifle to the splendour that lies before it in the infinite future" (*Survival*, p. 76).

§ *Eth. Nic.*, i., 13, 13.

jealousy,* or delay, they are an example and encouragement to us to do that will similarly on earth, and therefore while we do not pray to them, we do not ignore them, nor brush them aside as metaphors or dreams, but we are grateful to God for their sympathy, their ministry, and friendship. As the greatest of the Fathers, St. Augustine,† said, "we honour them in love," *honoramus in caritate.*

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

CHARLES PÉGUY

IF there is one feature that distinguishes the post-war ethical outlook it is the recognition that the greatest thing in life is Love, or what is imagined to be Love. If the modern man were to be asked what texts appealed to him the most, he would probably give as his answer some one of these, Love your enemy, God is Love, The greatest of these is Love. Indeed, the man in the street often gives as his reason for not being an active member of the Christian Church that religious bodies which profess to give their allegiance to Jesus Christ do not show forth that Love which He set up as the greatest thing in life.

And yet despite this universal acknowledgment of the rule of Love, a few people are vaguely uneasy. Can it be said that Faith and Hope are enthroned in their right places? There is much admirable work done by people who are interested in philanthropic institutions or societies, and these people often think that they are doing more work for their Master than by spending much time and energy in assisting some definite body. But the "religion of all sensible men," excellent as it may be for providing scoutmasters and peacemakers (let it not be thought for one instant that such people are not to receive high praise), nevertheless has little use for Faith and Hope. Yet there comes a challenge from across the Channel, a challenge,

* Dante, *Paradiso*, Cant. 3, 63-90, especially 79 ff.

> "The principle of blessedness is this:
> To keep ourselves within the Will Divine,
> So that as we are ranked from grade to grade
> Through all the realm, we are all satisfied,
> Just as the King who draws us to His Will.
> That Will Divine is our tranquillity,
> It is the sea to which creation moves."

Plato, *Timæus* (29E): "The good never feel envy about anything" (quoted by Irenæus, *Adv. Hær.*, iii., 25, 5). "Envy is placed outside the divine choir" (Plato, *Phædrus*, 247).

† Irenæus, v. 36, 2, says: "Man shall surpass angels"; Augustine (*de cat. rud.*, 25), that we shall be their equals.

be it said, written twenty years ago from a voice that was stilled in its prime in the Great War, a challenge that rings more true today even than when it was written:

"La Foi est une église, c'est une cathédrale enracinée au sol de France.
La Charité est un hôpital, un hôtel-Dieu qui ramasse toutes les miséres du monde,
Mais sans l'Espérance, tout ça ne serait qu'un cimetiére."

Péguy, the author of the challenge, is interesting for two reasons. He was one of those Frenchmen who stood (even if they did not become active members of the Catholic Church) for that Catholic culture which, where France is concerned, is bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh which she largely lost during the latter half of the nineteenth century, but was slowly regaining during the ten years that preceded the outbreak of the war. He is also an exceedingly interesting psychological study. Why, though anxious to believe, did he not actually return to active membership of the Church in which he was baptized?

Charles Péguy—although much was written about him immediately after his death, we owe the best study of him to the brothers Tharaud, who knew him intimately at college and afterwards—was the son of an Orleans joiner who died when the lad was in his infancy. His mother, a sturdy, hard-working peasant, made a precarious livelihood by repairing chairs and letting rooms. (The story, repeated by the late Rev. G. C. Rawlinson, that she let her chairs in Orleans Cathedral is apparently not true. Indeed, like her son in later life, she never went to Mass on Sundays, believing that God was to be better praised and worshipped in the trivial round and common task of household duties.) The little fatherless lad was brought up by his mother and grandmother; of the latter he says most charmingly, "Elle ne savait ni lire ni écrire, à qui je dois tout, de qui je tiens tout ce que je suis." He learnt his catechism at the parish church of St. Aignan, and imbibed anti-clerical ideas at the elementary school. Scholarships took him to the *École Normale* at Paris, and in the Rue d'Ulm he gave up the practice of religion. Undergraduate-like, he had great ideas of founding the Augustinian city of God, the great Socialist republic. He apparently had great affection and respect for Monseigneur Batiffol, then chaplain at the school, and actually consented to help with some Catholic undergraduates at a soup kitchen in a Paris slum, though he had sufficient good sense to realize that the soup kitchen would not solve the social problem; in fact, he was a little bit contemptuous of it.

But all his fellow-undergraduates adored him and looked up to him to lead them in everything. He also consented to join a St. Vincent de Paul Society and actually became its president,

though as he objected to the proceedings beginning with prayer, the opening prayers were said by the vice-president, and he came in immediately afterwards. To those who constantly exalt the French mind as "logical," it may appear rather strange for an avowed agnostic to be president of a Church society, but it is consoling to think that the Church of England is not the only Church against which the charge of inconsistency and muddling through can be levelled. Indeed, in Péguy and in his writings there is much that can be described as almost "Anglican," though he had probably, Frenchman rooted to France as he was, very little idea as to the existence or nature of *Ecclesia Anglicana*. "Nous sommes infiniment plus liés à l'esclavage de tout fait que nous ne sommes liés à l'esclavage du désordre." In this sentence he unconsciously stated the Anglican case against Rome.

He had an enormous circle of friends of various sorts, including Jaurés, the international Socialist, with whom he broke upon the question of internationalism, Romaine Rolland, the Tharaud brothers, Baillet, afterwards a Benedictine, Lotte, and many others. But he astonished them all when he disappeared from the school on a mysterious leave of absence, which was in reality to write a play upon a Catholic saint, St. Joan.

In this first play he made her the first Socialist breaking away from authority, in the same way as Mr. Shaw made her the first Protestant.

Thenceforward Péguy began to drift slowly backward towards the Catholicism of his childhood. Yet he was never formally converted. The play upon the Catholic soldier saint annoyed many of his Socialist friends, who walked no more with him, and Jaurés and he separated upon the subject of Pacificism. He indulged in a kind of Quietism, praying for hours on end, and when his little son lay sick made a pilgrimage upon foot to Chartres, where he spent much time in the cathedral in prayer before the Blessed Sacrament, but would not stay for the Mass. Péguy is often classed among those countless Frenchmen who in the decade before the War left agnosticism for the Catholic Faith, but his conversion, if it can be called conversion, was of a very qualified nature. His ideas were extraordinary. For instance, largely for political reasons, he disliked the clergy, and he actually said that the sacraments were an invention of the parsons; no Protestant fanatic could have been more bitter upon the subject of priestcraft. He believed in grace, but maintained that it could be gained by prayer, and that the sacraments were not necessary to salvation. He also had a horror of converts. In 1912 Renan's young grandson came home from Africa, where he had been serving as an army officer, got

into touch with Jacques Maritain, and was received into the Church, having ideas of eventually joining the Dominican order. (His death in the early days of the war prevented this ideal from being realized.) Ernest Psichari had been a friend of Péguy's, and had dedicated a book to him, yet Péguy rounded upon him and said that he had no business to be converted, that he was disloyal to the memory of his grandfather.

Maritain was exceedingly worried. One of the stumbling-blocks was Péguy's wife, who had never been baptized. They had been married in the register office, and their children were not brought up as Catholics. Maritain went down to Lozère and had an interview with Madame Péguy and her formidable old mother, Madame Baudouin. The French custom of having a mother-in-law domiciled in one's house has its obvious disadvantages, and no one was surprised to learn that there was a "scène épouvantable." Nor did the worthy Maritain, a scholastic philosopher, have much better success with Péguy himself. Péguy had no interest in Aquinas, in the same way that he had, much to the scandal of his fellow-Socialists, no interest in Karl Marx as the oracle of Socialism. Further, Péguy, like many of the converts of those days, had come under the influence of Bergson's philosophy, which M. Maritain has exposed in a book, in which he submits it to his usual scholastic tests. Those who know M. Maritain's *Trois Réformateurs*—it has been recently translated into English, and deals with Luther, Descartes, and Rousseau, claiming that their spiritual pride has wrought much havoc in the modern world—would not be exactly surprised if he had added a fourth, Charles Péguy. For Péguy certainly had pride.

Many of Péguy's friends, who indulged in fulsome panegyrics of him after his death, ignored this. Péguy with all his love for the downcast and the oppressed, the working classes among whom he had been brought up at Orleans, was self-centred and lacked humility, but he did not altogether lack self-knowledge. And a true self-analysis is wonderfully brought out in his writings on Hope, which virtue he exalted above her sister virtues; this was largely the result of his admiration for Bergson, whose lectures at that time were bringing the world to the doors of the Collége de France.

Bergson's philosophy deliberately turned its back upon the nineteenth-century materialistic conception of the Universe, upon Mill and Spencer, and the Germans, and contained a conception of hopefulness upon which Péguy eagerly seized. "Ce qui tue l'esprit, c'est l'habitude de penser par idées toutes faites. Quand nous cédons à ce penchant, nous cessons d'être

des vivants pour devenir des mécanismes. Rien ne bourgeonne plus en nous, nous ne sommes plus qu'écorce et bois mort." Péguy amplified these words of Bergson in his description of Hope as being "la fleur et le fruit et la feuille et la branche et le rameau et le bourgeon et le germe et le bouton et le bourgeon et le bouton de la fleur de l'éternité même." Hope was the little shoot, the little acorn which sprouted and brought the promise of spring into outlooks, that renewed our strength with new ideas, without which we should be but dead wood.

But this Bergsonian attack upon ready-made, cut-and-dried ideas is completely opposed to dogmatism, which resulted in the paradoxical situation that while Bergson attracted scores of young intellectuals to Catholicism from the pessimistic, mechanical view of the Universe, inculcated into them by the Germans, his works were placed upon the Index, and Maritain actually wrote a book against the philosophy which had brought about his conversion. Bergson's philosophy is more acceptable to Anglicans, for it laid down that philosophers in their search after truth could not be divided into rival schools of thought like advocates fighting over a cause, but were rather, to use Péguy's simile, in the position of doctors who might hold different opinions, but were or ought to be united in one object—that of fighting for the life of the patient. There would be room under such a system for the various parties of the Church of England to exist side by side, all united in the search after truth, though using different methods, but there would be no room for the dogmatic attitude of the Church of Rome.

Yet it would be difficult to imagine Péguy as an Anglican. He was so thoroughly French that the only Christian body that he understood was the Roman Church; French Protestantism (though he had Protestant friends and subscribers to the famous *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, his fortnightly review) had no appeal for him. Those who truly are of France and understand her know that it is the Catholic Church or nothing where Christianity is concerned with her, and Péguy, every inch of him, was a Frenchman. Péguy is interesting, not only as a writer, but also as a psychological study. The problem of the Péguys of this world is not an easy one, as all wise priests will know. It is the problem of the human will acting against authority, and the decision has to be made between authority on the one hand, which may be of God or merely arbitrary and vexatious, and on the other hand, the human will that may be full of spiritual pride, which the Church declares to be the most evil of the deadly sins, or may be completely righteous. Was Péguy a righteous man refusing to submit to a Church that was unreasonable in its demands and corrupted by political follies, or was he

a proud and wilful soul battling against the authority which he well knew to be of God, yet to which he refused in his obstinacy to submit ?

After Péguy's death in the war books poured forth to defend him, to make him the hero of injustice fighting against Ultramontanism; yet when we realize that while he spent hours in prayer he rejected the sacraments as inventions of the clergy, and look at his life more calmly and dispassionately, we are apt to tremble. It is quite obvious that Péguy had pride; he was self-centred with all his philanthropic endeavour, and as a result he was most unhappy. "We often call it charity, when 'tis only longing of the flesh, but man's own bent and man's own will, man's love of self, man's love of ease, are seldom absent from his deeds." These words of the wise old monk seem to belong to Péguy. Maritain's sister, who before her conversion had edited a children's anti-clerical paper from his office, came to see him one day and found him in a state of depression. She spoke to him as a Salvation Army lass might have spoken to a down-and-out of the streets, hesitating whether to enter the Gospel Hall and hear the message of salvation:

"How are you ?"

"Very bad. I am going away. I cannot go on much longer."

"Is it only this illness that is worrying you ?"

"You know well, all is in a mix-up. I am suffering horribly, I want to die."

"Before living as our Lord demands of you ?"

"I am tired, at an end, worn out; my life in the world has been a failure."

"You can change it if you change your heart. You can do nothing without Jesus."

"I pray without ceasing, but despite that I am fearfully unhappy."

"I am not surprised that you are tempted, worried. You have deceived us all and are doing nothing to develop your Christian life."

"I have graces that you don't suspect."

"Quite so; because of those graces, you should show your gratitude to God. If you don't go on, you will fall back."

"My life is hard. I am crushed. Ah, if only I could communicate."

"That is just what God desires—to heal you, to give you interior peace and peace in your home. Go and talk to a priest."

"The priests wouldn't know how to speak to me."

It was tragic. Mdlle. Maritain was quite right. Péguy, in

his proud aloofness from the Church and her sacraments, was in reality trying to live without Jesus and was, as a result, in hell, "the eternal absence," as he himself once called it.

Yet this man who needed our Lord so badly went further in his writings to believe in Him than he did in his own life. That was part of Péguy's tragedy; he realized what Hope was, he found in the Bergsonian philosophy a religion of Hope, yet he could not find it in real life. He wrote three dramas concerning St. Joan, dramatic monologues might be a more accurate description of them, in which he pictured St. Joan as a little girl at Domrémy listening to a Franciscan nun, Madame Gervaise, instruct her as to her mission in life and more especially in the virtue of Hope. St. Joan was really Péguy himself listening to the instruction, but in his life he did not heed the instruction so closely as St. Joan did in his book.

Of Hope he writes: "Elle est essentiellement la contre-habitude. Et ainsi elle est diamétralement et axialement et centralement la contre-mort. Elle est la jaillissement et la grâce. Elle est le cœur de la liberté. Elle est la vertu du nouveau et la vertu du jeune. Et ce n'est pas en vain qu'elle est Théologale et elle est la Princesse même des Theologales et ce n'est pas en vain qu'elle est au centre des Théologales, car sans elle la Foi glisserait sur ce revêtement de l'habitude; et sans elle la Charité glisserait sur ce revêtement de l'habitude. Et c'est elle notamment qui garantit à l'Église qu'elle ne succombera pas sous son mécanisme. . . . Et elle est Dauphine et Fille de France. Et ce n'est pas en vain qu'elle marche au centre entre ses deux grands sœurs et que ses deux grandes sœurs lui donnent la main. Mais elles ne lui donnent pas la main dans le sens que l'on croit. Parcequ'elle est petite on croit qu'elle a besoin des autres. Pour marcher. Mais ce sont les autres au contraire qui ont besoin d'elle. Et qui sont bien contentes de lui donner la main. Pour marcher. Car la Foi sans elle aurait pris l'habitude du monde et sans elle la Charité aurait pris l'habitude du pauvre. Et ainsi la Foi sans elle et sans elle la Charité auraient pris chacune de son côté l'habitude même de Dieu."

And even if Péguy did not live up to his ideals—by no means the first of us who has failed to do that—he has indeed left a message which is apposite. Charity hopeth all things, he reminded the world. When Charity ceases to hope she becomes something else, Humanitarianism, which in the words of a wise teacher is the most subtle enemy of religion. He attacked with far-seeing wisdom the habit of his fellow-countrymen to think of "la retraite," the pension to which apparently every Frenchman hoped to arrive in his old age with the minimum of trouble in

this life, a habit not unknown among many young men and women on the threshold of life in our own country who think mainly of the soundness of an easy job and its prospects. To Péguy this was spiritual death. It was the spirit of despair and of barrenness. "Ainsi nous voyons en économique ce que nous pourrions voir en morale, et en psychologie, et en metaphysique, si nous avions de meuilleurs yeux. Mais c'est plus grossi en économique: que cette tranquillité à qui vont tous les vœux des modernes, est essentiellement principe d'infécondité. C'est toujours la race qui paie. Pour avoir la paix demain, on n'a pas d'enfants aujourd'hui. . . . Pour avoir la paix l'instant d'aprés, nous faisons du présent un temps de sagesse, de prévoyance, d'infécondité, un temps mort et mortuaire, un temps passé." Has not this a message for a generation that is so bankrupt of ideals that it would seek to solve the unemployment problem with family limitation?

But it is impossible to conclude without mention of the conversion, the greatest day in Péguy's life. On the Feast of the Assumption, 1914, we know from a hastily scribbled letter to a friend that he heard Mass, the first time since his childhood, in some obscure village church in Lorraine during the shock of the German invasion. At last he had lost self and found Jesus, as Mdlle. Maritain would have said. Three weeks later he was killed. And it might be as well to conclude on a note of joy an essay which breaks off with the fateful day August 1, 1914, in which he well describes the difference between Protestant and Catholic, whom he imagines making the Pilgrim's Progress. "Les protestants sont des gens qui font eux-mêmes leurs poteaux indicateurs. Et ils sont chacun leurs poteaux indicateurs. Et non seulement ils les font mais ils les justifient tout le temps. Le catholique au contraire est un garçon qui arrive sur la route et qui trouve trés bon pour lui le poteau indicateur qu'il y a pour tout le monde. Et non seulement cela, mais ces poteaux indicateurs, qui sont pour tout le monde, il ne les consulte même pas pour savoir sa route. Il la connait bien sa route, il la sait, il la voit, il fait comme tout le monde, il suit comme tout le monde. On voit bien la route. Il consulte les poteaux indicateurs pour éprouver une certaine joie qui est une joie rituelle de la route, pour accomplir un certain rite qui est un rite de la route. . . . Le Catholique se sert de ceux qu'il y a. Il sait qu'il y a des ingenieurs, des cantonniers, des conducteurs des ponts et chaussées. Conducteurs, quel mot admirable." Had Péguy at last an idea of reconciling himself with the Church?

C. H. PALMER.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We should be glad to hear of a contributor to THEOLOGY who would be willing to post his number to a worker in the Mission-Field.

Under the title *Children and Life* the S.P.C.K. has published a series of pamphlets by various authors dealing with the training of children. The writers maintain that the instinct of religion is an integral part of human nature; and that the child, rightly taught, will discover God for himself. The first paper deals with the "Child's Approach to God"; the second, entitled "Teaching about Prayer," contains some valuable suggestions for giving a true conception of prayer from the earliest age. The third and fourth papers are concerned with "New Versions of Old Virtues" and "Children's Questions," both of these being intended to help those parents who find it difficult to reconcile established truths with modern science and modern methods. Throughout the papers runs the sound principle that religious teaching must be a part of the whole life and that there must be no setting up of false barriers.

The pamphlets are well produced and printed, and each contains a useful bibliography. The price is 4d. or 6d.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

(*a*) St. Mark vi. 45-51, and St. John vi. 15-21.

In the latter passage ἤθελον and εὐθέως need elucidation. The *New Commentary* thinks that the disciples had intended to land on the north-west shore, but were driven by the storm further south to the land of Gennesaret. I suggest that this (or Capernaum) was their original destination. Our Lord, anxious to get His disciples away from those who would make Him a king, and also to have some time for prayer, sent them on in the boat, with instructions to take Him in at the coast near Bethsaida Julias—an easy walk from the site of the feeding. But a northerly gale sprang up which made it extremely difficult for them to reach the north shore. Our Lord from the shore saw them "tortured with rowing"; and, as they were unable to reach Him, He came to them walking on the water. May we not think that St. John's ἤθελον refers to St. Mark's ἤθελεν? "He wished to come alongside of them" (not, I think, to "pass by"); but they were afraid of Him at first: then, after His "be not afraid," "they were willing to receive Him." Having taken Him in, not only did the gale die down, but they changed course to south-west for Capernaum, and were therefore running before what remained of the gale: so they arrived εὐθέως, quickly and without further difficulty.

I have already (*Ch. Quart. Rev.* for July, p. 268) given other reasons for rejecting Dr. Bernard's recent view, that it was near the sea, not on the sea, that the disciples saw Jesus walking.

THE TWO FEEDINGS

No principle seems to be involved in maintaining that there were two. Nevertheless, criticism seems to show itself unhealthily voracious in

reducing them to one. For (i.) it is admitted that our Lord's method was to repeat His teaching by word: why not also His teaching by act? (ii.) His other acts of mercy were repeated: why not that of feeding? (iii.) Dr. Cuthbert Turner in the *New Commentary* thinks he sees reason for regarding St. Mark vii. 24-viii. 12 as from a non-Petrine source; but he regards the Petrine source as resumed at viii. 13; yet in verses 19 and 20 we get both feedings spoken of. Moreover, what becomes of "Peter's close relation to the Gospel," if it was not submitted to him before being issued? (iv.) It has often been pointed out that not only the numbers differ, but the words used for the receptacles of the fragments. (v.) Moreover, though both on the eastern side of the sea, the former was at the northern end, not far from Bethsaida Julias; the latter was considerably further south, in the Decapolis (vii. 31 and viii. 10). (vi.) Finally, the former, which took place when "the Passover was at hand," seems to have had a Messianic significance, there being no urgent physical need, while the latter was a work of mercy only, for people who had been with Him for three days.

G. H. TREMENHEERE.

(*b*) 1 Cor. xi. 24. *Τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν.*

These words in which our Lord directed what was to be done in the Eucharist, and also stated its purpose, are translated in our English New Testament, and also in the Prayer of Consecration in our Communion office. "Do this in remembrance of me." This rendering, however, does certainly not express the full significance of the words. A more adequate rendering would be "Do this for my memorial."

The first mention of "memorial" in Holy Scripture is in Leviticus ii., in the rules and the ritual of the "meal offering."

A "meal offering" was always an offering of corn, usually of corn bruised or ground into meal (flour), and sometimes baked into bread. The greater part of a meal offering was usually appropriated for the maintenance of the priests who ministered in the tabernacle, or afterwards the temple. But it was not so appropriated until a small portion of the meal offered, a "handful," had been taken out of the mass and burnt as a "fire offering" to the Lord upon the altar of burnt offering. The small portion thus burnt was called the "memorial" of the larger portion otherwise appropriated. It was "the memorial thereof" (Lev. ii. 2, 3, etc.). The offering of this "handful," this "memorial," was equivalent to saying: "In offering to Thee, O Lord, this handful, we offer to Thee the whole."

The underlying principle of all "memorial" was that, by means of a lesser offering, a greater or better offering was set before God. This principle pervaded the whole sacrificial system of the Old Testament, and re-appeared as we shall see in the New.

The word translated "memorial" in the Levitical rules is *azkarah*, which is a substantive formed from the verb *hizkir*, which means to cause a person to remember something, to set it before his mind. Memorial, therefore, *azkarah*, is setting something before the mind of Him to whom the offering is made.

The word is sometimes used as the name of what was actually burnt, as in the words "the priest shall burn the memorial thereof" (Lev. ii. 2); in which case the word *azkarah* is preceded by *eth*, the sign of the accusative.

Sometimes the word signifies not the material offered, but the purpose of its offering, viz., that it may serve as a memorial. In this case the preposition *le* is prefixed, and we have not *eth azkarah*, but *le azkarah*—*i.e.*, for a memorial before God.

Now here comes in what is very interesting. In the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament *eth azkarah* is rendered μνημόσυνον (in the accusative); but *le azkarah*, indicating the purpose of the offering, is rendered εἰς ἀνάμνησιν.

This is most important; for here we have the very words of our Lord at the institution of the Eucharist, τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν.

The Eucharist then is an action (τοῦτο ποιεῖτε), for a prescribed purpose (εἰς); which is to be our Lord's memorial (τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν).

And this, according to the scriptural use of the phrase, is the setting before God our Lord's own (τὴν ἐμὴν) self-offering. As in the Old Testament, so in the New, the ἀνάμνησις is a God-ward action. It is not a mere remembering, a mere setting before our own minds; it is a setting it before God.

Bp. John Wordsworth, of Salisbury, that eminent liturgiologist, and by no means a Romanizer, well said in his visitation addresses on the Holy Communion (p. 25; Longmans, Green and Co.): "When our Lord said τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν, He did not merely mean 'Do this to remind yourselves of me,' but 'By this make a solemn commemoration of me to God.'"

It is surely desirable that in our Prayer of Consecration we should use the exactly correct translation of our Lord's words, thus expressing their *full* meaning; which is not fully expressed in our present Prayer of Consecration. In this matter our Prayer Book certainly needs revision.

If it be objected that we cannot set before God what is always before Him, that we cannot bid Him remember what He never can forget, it may be answered that He himself said: "The bow shall be in the cloud, and I will look upon it that I may remember the everlasting covenant" (Gen. ix. 16); and again, "Put me in remembrance" (Isa. xliii. 26).

If the objection is still urged, then we must cease making our requests known unto God (Phil. iv. 6) or confessing our sins to Him, seeing that He knows them already.

U. Z. RULE.

NOTES

(*A.*)

"BUCHMANISM" IN SOUTH AFRICA

(IMPRESSIONS OF A CATHOLIC)

A YEAR ago a group of undergraduates from Oxford came out, led by a priest, and visited the universities and chief schools here. The main body, of which they were the vanguard, is now in the country under the real leader, the Rev. Frank Buchman, a Lutheran minister from America, "F. B." as he is called. They have held "house-parties" in the largest centres. One has just ended at an hotel in Johannesburg. It lasted a week and was visited by the Bishop there, by the Bishop of Bloemfontein, and by many of the clergy at different times.

All who have read *Life-changers* by Harold Begbie will know their ways of work. It is modern evangelism with "pep and a punch"; an observer described it as "the Salvation Army for educated people." Their aim is to get going groups in which religious experiences are shared and moral difficulties discussed. A meeting, which must be unique, was held in the Town Hall at Pretoria. The hall was packed to the doors with all types from every Church and no Church, and young men and women were predominant.

Members and Methods

I was chiefly impressed by two things: the obvious sincerity and the brilliant stage-management of the affair. It was "put on and put across" with absolute success and was a most interesting study of modern evangelism for the educated. There were no hymns, no prayers, no readings: the platform was not used: the "Oxford Group," all in what novels call "faultless evening dress," sat in a semicircle along one side of the hall with "F. B." in the centre; if one was crudely reminded of a pierrot-troupe it was of a troupe that was first class; there were all ages from twenty to seventy and both sexes; at least half were Americans and two or three were South Africans, including a "Springbok"—"Rugby International" we should call him—who spoke in Afrikaans, South African Dutch, a brilliant touch enthusiastically received by the citizens of a town that is more than half Dutch; there were two or three priests, and two sons and two daughters of Bishops (the movement is entirely interdenominational); there were a Baron and Baroness from Holland—a country that is, of course, largely represented here. In all there were some twenty-five. Of these twenty or more, cheerily introduced by the chairman, spoke in turn for about five minutes each, half standing, half sitting on the table in front of the enormous audience which was not arranged in formal rows but sat and stood in a gigantic semicircle round the Group. One thing is certain: no one could call these people neurotic; a more sane and healthy-looking crowd one would go far to find.

There was no false emotion and no attempt to work on feelings; nor was there any appeal to the audience to "come up and testify" or to "decide for Christ." The speakers left the audience to draw their own impressions from the personal experience offered. The meeting lasted for three hours and a half but was divided by tea—somehow every individual had a cup and a sandwich—and an offer for all to go who wished. A few went away, but very few they were. The rest stayed, fascinated, like men of old by the Sirens' song.

The Word and the Witness

The "Testimony," as it would have been called in former days, was very striking; it was given by all simply and sincerely, and after every speech there was clapping. The general tone of the speeches was light-hearted and jolly, and there were frequent jokes. The same phrases kept cropping up and chiming in again and again; these evangelists have their own "jargon," though it is different from the old. The word conversion was heard once; salvation never; they all spoke of "changing one's life"; they had all found "a new quality of life"; to gain this all had found it necessary "to be honest with themselves, to strip off their masks." They were quite free with the word sin—with many their trouble had been

"wrong relationships towards others" or "formality without reality" or "inability to give true help." They had felt a hunger and a need. After their lives had been changed they had been kept going by the use of a "quiet time" in the morning; "Two-way Prayer; we have one mouth but two ears; we ought to listen to God twice as much as we speak." They believed intensely in guidance by the Holy Spirit; even in details they found God often told them directly what to do; their religion was the Bible, the New Testament. The name of our Lord was most frequently mentioned by every speaker. They had found Christ, been brought to Jesus Christ. They had come "to share their experiences."

The Central Phrase

That was clearly the central phrase—sharing their experiences. An American business man confessed that he had been drifting and dissipated; the group had brought him to Christ and anchorage; a pretty young American said that her devil had been day-dreaming; she had found Christ and concentration. Another had turned from "worshipping brawn, brains, and beauty to worshipping God."

An Oxford man, now an attorney in Johannesburg, told of a long course of drinking from which he had been stopped four days before; a charming undergraduate from St. Hugh's had lived for popularity only; Christ had made her not to care for the crowd; an elderly headmistress, an Anglo-Catholic since the age of twenty, had found formality become reality and had gained a sympathy with youth unknown before; the son of a missionary bishop had been released from a "merely respectable religion." So it went on with hammer-strokes that hit the nail. Admission was made that there was nothing new; they were no society and neither had nor would have any organization.

It is only fair to add that I have heard of Churches and of Churchmen reawakened through this movement; lapsed communicants have come back with a new sense of life. No new Church or society is set up. At a "house-party" lines similar to those of the meeting are followed, but they "get to business" with individuals; this is the work that matters above all; again here they share their experiences and discuss their difficulties.

Criticism

A few words of sympathetic criticism will not be amiss. First, theology is undervalued. Several speakers depreciated it and disclaimed any interest in it. The Group badly needs to be told that theology is simply an intellectual formulation of experiences like those of which they speak with such enthusiasm. They assume the very theology they depreciate. In fact, they generally undervalue the use of the intellect with the result that, secondly, "guidance" is over-valued. While no one would wish to deny its reality, their claimed dependence upon guidance in all the detail of life appears to be too facile and uncritical.

Thirdly, Institutional Religion is undervalued. They need the Church more than they care to admit. The Bishop of Pretoria spoke to them on these lines. They need to find in the Church and the Sacraments that which is objective, "given," and independent of feeling or intuition, that which will reinforce them when doubts of the reality of their experience assail—as they must.

Fourthly, the group-sharing is an inadequate substitute for Con-

fession. The first reason for confessing sins is that they may be forgiven. Absolution and the assurance of forgiveness are not given by the mere sharing of difficulties; nor will the reserved and the sensitive, who might use the Sacrament of Penance, be catered for by this method. On the other hand, a leader told me that a Group had Anglo-Catholic members who went to Confession—though he himself considered it should be no longer necessary—and there is nothing necessarily inconsistent with a practice of Catholicism.

A Great Evening

These criticisms have been made in no unsympathetic spirit. The experience of that evening was real and appreciable. Many priests claim a new vision and new possibilities as a result of their contact with the Group. The Presbyterian minister in Pretoria, an able and distinguished man, has declared that he has been a changed man since he met them. More than one well-known headmaster, including Fr. Eustace Hill, C.R., of St. John's College, Johannesburg, has spoken of them in the warmest terms and their effect on school-boys. It is clear that confirmation classes, Bible classes and fellowships can be improved by the Group methods. How far and wide the movement has spread in Oxford cannot, of course, be estimated. We were led to believe that the "athletic element"—notoriously untouched by ordinary means of evangelism—has been influenced greatly. A different section would probably damn the movement as "hearty." "F. B." was staying at Cambridge in my time there, but one heard little of him. Was the soil barren? A Cambridge man must frankly admit that this is emphatically not one of the lost causes for which Oxford is said to be famous. Good luck go with the movement! Those who are inclined to criticize will do well to consider again the old familiar counsel of Gamaliel.

Geoffrey Carlisle.

Pretoria,
August, 1929.

(*B.*)

FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

The American Catholic Philosophical Association held its fourth annual meeting this year in Milwaukee. The meeting was open to the public; therefore, as an Anglican priest who is interested in Philosophy, I made it a point to be present.

This Association is part of a quite recent programme conducted by the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, to meet the problem of modern learning coupled with "the faith once for all delivered to the Saints."

The papers dealt with the "Metaphysical Foundations of Moral Obligation"; "Psychology and Ethics"; "Recent Ethical Theory"; "Some Tendencies in the Philosophy of Society," and "Methods of Teaching Philosophy in College and Seminaries." The final paper, which was the great paper, was on "Trends in American Thought."

This paper was read by Dom Francis Augustine Walsh, O.S.B., who

teaches at the Catholic University in Washington, D.C. Father Augustine received his education in England.

I was interested in the discussions, which were general and frank. The Philosophical Association seemed a bit restive over a recent pronouncement of the Holy See that all philosophy classes should be conducted exclusively in the Latin language. I also noted both a fundamentalist and modernist approach to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Being a young man I was impressed by the fact that most of the papers were read by young priests.

The Association seemed to be in agreement with Father Augustine's statement that Spinoza is the coming influence in philosophical thought in this country. Several references were made to popular articles on philosophy and religion that have appeared in *Harper's Magazine*. I heard a number of quotations from the writings of Rashdall, and the priests seemed to be familiar with his thought. To my great regret, however, there was no reference made to von Hügel. This lack of appreciation of the greatness of von Hügel by the Church of Rome may well be contrasted with the glowing tribute paid von Hügel by the retiring president of the Federal Council of Churches, Dr. S. Parks Cadman, who is a Congregationalist.

Finally, it should be noted that the Roman Catholic Church is promoting more Colleges and Universities in this country than any other Christian Church.

FRANCIS J. BLOODGOOD,
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NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Zeitschrift für die A.T.liche Wissenschaft. 1929. Heft 3.

The articles in this number are very technical. H. W. HERTZBERG writes an exhaustive monograph on Mizpah, of Benjamin, which he considers has not been identified by recent excavations. E. ROBERTSON discusses the very obscure vintage song of Isaiah xxvii. 2-6, to which he ascribes an Arabian origin, perhaps *c.* 400 B.C., when the Nabatæans occupied Edom. W. MUNDLE has an essay on the religious problem of 2(4) Ezra. The unity of the book is now generally recognized. The supposed parallels to St. Paul's thought are fallacious; the writer moves in the sphere of Old Testament ideas of suffering as a clear proof of sin.

W. K. L. C.

The Harvard Theological Review. 1929. Number 3.

The entire number is occupied by an essay on "The Pharisees: their Origin and their Philosophy," by L. Finkelstein, of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York. A great deal of new and interesting detail is given. The thesis is that the Pharisees were originally an urban, the Sadducees a rural, party. Gradually the Pharisees won over the farmers until the Sadducees retained only the great landowners. The Sadducees, as is well known, were wealthy and lived in Jerusalem. Land was then the only source of wealth and so the Sadducees must have been absentee landowners. One is reluctant to criticize a distinguished Jewish scholar, but was there no trade in the first century? How did the hundreds of thousands of Jews in Alexandria live? Were they all absentee landlords? Our suspicion that a theory is being pressed too hard is confirmed when

Mr. Finkelstein, confronted with the statement of Josephus that the Sadducees were "rather boorish," explains it by their peasant origin. If an English Duke living in London was rude, should we say that was due to his peasant origin? W. K. L. C.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique.

The three leading articles in the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* are entirely historical. In the first, Father Mollat explores the application of the *droit de régale spirituelle* in France from the twelfth to the fourteenth century. As he adduces relevant references to the documents, it is easy to see how much the reader gains from a really learned article. This discussion is to have a sequel to which we look forward. Father Nelis discusses the "Congrégation" of the cathedral chapters of the ecclesiastical province from Rheims to Saint-Quentin, and he too discusses it with numerous documents. Here much research in local history will be required before the results can be fully substantiated. At the same time, it is quite clear that the activities of the "Congrégation" raised in no mean degree the discipline of the clergy of the province of Rheims. Father Polman examines the polemical method of the early adversaries of the Reformation. We should feel glad to see attention paid to the position of Luther before 1520 and particularly before 1517. For it is often forgotten that Luther nailed his famous theses to the church door not as a friend of the Reformation but as the enemy of foul abuses prevalent in the Church. The practices of Tetzel disgusted him, as they disgusted every Churchman of the second decade of the sixteenth century. Along with these three articles there are the usual notices of the contents of the learned magazines, so far as these contents bear on ecclesiastical history. Apart from the three articles, these notices of themselves serve as an invaluable aid to all serious students of history, ecclesiastical or secular, for where is one to draw the line? R. H. M.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xx., No. 1.

Half of this number is taken up with an important article from the pen of Professor Solomon Zeitlin on the Slavonic Josephus. Prof. Zeitlin points out that the language of this Slavonic Josephus is not Slavonic at all but old North Russian, that the translation was made into the Old Russian some time during the twelfth or thirteenth century from a Byzantine Greek version, which had been compiled probably during the seventh or eighth century. He further shows that the author in this Byzantine Greek version made free use of the Latin Hegeasippus and the Hebrew Josippon, which were compiled probably in the fourth and fifth centuries. The Latin Hegesippus, evidently the work of a Christian, professes to be a revised edition of Josephus, while the Hebrew Josippon, compiled for the purpose of giving a Jewish version of Josephus, was continually being added to by later scribes. From this it is easy to discredit the Slavonic Josephus, the importance of which has been recently greatly exaggerated in certain quarters. Professor Zeitlin maintains that the author of the "Christ passage," Josephus, *Antiquities*, Bk. XXIII., ch. iii., § 3, quoted by Eusebius I. xi., is none other than Eusebius himself.

Rabbi Herbert Parzen contributes a useful article on the Holy Spirit in Tannaitic Literature, and Professor G. H. Box an appreciative review of Dr. Hugo Odberg's edition of the *Hebrew Book of Enoch*. R. D. M.

Theologische Blätter. August.

Freiherr v. Campenhausen, in his inaugural lecture at Marburg, November 10, 1928, discusses Tertullian's treatment of tradition, oral or written, in relation to apostolic teaching. Dr. Deissmann gives an account of his visit to America March 6 to April 24 of this year, when he lectured at the Universities of Boston, Chicago, Princeton, and Yale, and at Oberlin College, Ohio.

Theologische Blätter. September.

Prof. I. Witte, in a lecture given at the annual festival of the Theological Union (Verbindung) of Berlin, examines the idea of the universal salvation of Christianity, and its practical realization. O. Lindton, of Upsala, writes on the lost ending of St. Mark's Gospel, and suggests that the Gospel might have ended at xvi. 8, which he considers grammatically and theologically probable.

Theologische Blätter. October.

Pastor J. Meyer contributes a report of the holiday course for Germans, Danes, and Swedes on theology and the philosophic view of the world, held at Göttingen, July 6 to 20.

We note with interest that Prof. K. L. Schmidt, editor of *Theologische Blätter*, will be transferred after November 1 from the University of Jena to Bonn.

L. P.

REVIEWS

THE LORD OF LIFE: A FRESH APPROACH TO THE INCARNATION. By Various Writers. London: Student Christian Movement. 10s.

The importance of some books lies not so much in the intrinsic value of their contents as in the significance of their point of view when considered in relation to the quarter from which they emerge. So it is with this present volume. The contributions which compose it possess, taken as a whole, that merit which their authors' names would lead us to expect; but it is the general attitude, and the outcome of that attitude, taken and pursued by this group of writers belonging to the Swanwick Free Church Fellowship, which deserve special attention. For here, the properly religious relation to Christ, characteristic of the Christian, a relation of dependence and worship, is combined with a theology which is in a state of wide, if not extreme, detachment from those classical categories of Christian thought which have provided for the scientific expression of the truth implicit in the religious relation.

The first part, entitled "The Human Problem," may be taken as an introduction. It is made up of two chapters, sound work, but not too easy to get on with. Mr. John Lewis writes on "Reality in Religion." We are warned against abstract approaches to the doctrines of God and of the Person of Christ. The emphasis falls upon the relation between our experience and the revelation of the character of the life of Jesus given in the Gospels. Jesus is to be worshipped "because all that is in Him is Divine, in the sense that it compels our assent to its authoritative demonstration of the true way of life for mankind." The keynote of the book has been struck. At the same time, Mr. Lewis himself, as his closing pages show, is more sympathetic to the old dogmatic, as expressed in the Two Natures formula, than are some of his colleagues. Mr. G. E. Darlaston, in "Man's Need of a Deliverer," discusses the nature of the conflict within man, and leads up to the thought of evil as entrenched in illusion. This, in turn, prepares the way for a description of the work of "The Historic Jesus." Mr. Darlaston touches on this, but leaves the development of the thought for Dr. A. T. Cadoux, who introduces the second part of the book, "Christ in the New Testament," with a chapter on "The Historic Jesus." This is an historical and psychological study. Of special importance for his working out of his theme is his

attention to what he calls "the national appeal of Jesus." This involved the hard task "of bringing the Jews to such a knowledge of God as would make them love the Gentiles. Yet nothing but this could save Israel from ruinous struggle with Rome, or lift the one living religion of the Roman world to the height at which it could serve the whole world's need of a truth to live by." But Jewish nationalism was too rigid: it refused to accept His message, and so, inevitably, sought and achieved His death. "Yet His death, like His life, was a triumph crowned by His resurrection." From these facts emerged a deeper knowledge of God and the "enthusiastic belief" of the Church of the first century, "that this Jesus who had been crucified was alive, was Christ and Lord, seated with God on the throne of the universe, and that He was with them 'all the days,' enabling them to share His triumph."

What I miss in Dr. Cadoux's article is an adequate attention to our Lord's Messianic self-consciousness, and, closely allied therewith, the sense of super-historical reality breaking through the history. I may put the matter in too modern a way, but that is the kind of impression which the Gospels seem to me to convey.

The late Dr. H. T. Andrews follows with a chapter on "The Christ of Apostolic Experience," one of the ablest contributions to the book. It is a study of the development within the New Testament of the theological interpretation of Jesus, with special attention to "the rich Christian experience of the first generation of believers;" and so we come to Dr. Vernon Bartlet's three chapters, which, as historical surveys, suggest an almost majestic competence. They are entitled "The Meaning and Task of Christology." "The Earlier Christologies," and "The Later Christologies." Certain sharp contrasts make themselves felt. The ancient Church operated with abstract ideas and terms, such as "nature" and "substance"; it did not approach "the unity of Christ's historical personality" along psychological lines; or, in so far as it did, the lines were those of Greek psychology, which was "analytic and abstract," whereas only through Hebraic psychology, which was "synthetic" and "concrete," do we gain the power to view aright "the religious personality of Christ Himself *in categories not foreign to the genius of His own historical consciousness.*" As against the orthodox patristic view that "the proper seat or form of personality in the God-man was His divine or Logos nature, not His human one," a truer view, partly anticipated in the Antiochene tradition, of the relation of the Logos to human nature in general, suggests "that the original nature or subject, and so the seat of personality in the one Christ, was His humanity, and the interpenetrating quality the Divine 'fire' of the personal Logos." "Modern

Kenotists" like the Greek Fathers have been in error at this point. Among modern theologians those whom Dr. Bartlet recognizes as akin to himself are Dorner, Dr. Rashdall, Dr. Raven, and Dr. W. R. Matthews. In different ways they react against the antithesis between human nature and divine nature and prefer dynamic conceptions of function to static conceptions of substance.

In close connection with Dr. Bartlet's chapter may be taken the first contribution to the fourth part, "Christ Today." It is by Professor Miall Edwards, and is entitled "A Christology in Modern Terms." The reinterpretation starts with an emphasis upon the Christian experience itself as the "primary and dynamic thing"; works through psychology, with some unfavourable comment on metaphysical abstractions, to ethics and the belief that "*personality ethically conceived* is the highest category both for philosophy and for Christian theology"; lays stress on the principle of value and its relation to personality; and finds in Jesus Christ "the best key to the nature of reality." Coming to the doctrinal question, Professor Edwards builds upon the full humanity and unique God-consciousness of Jesus, states his objections to the *via media*, between Sabellianism and Tritheism, of orthodoxy, and, urging that "the ethical *is* the metaphysical in its most revealing aspect," defines Christ's divinity as meaning that "the values incarnated in His character and the quality of His will are Divine, and reveal to us the nature of Ultimate Reality in so far as it can be revealed to man." To the question of the personal pre-existence of the "Divine element which became incarnate in Christ," he would reply that "it was in a sense eternally personal—for it was the Spirit of the eternal personal God—but not in the sense that it was *another* or second person side by side with the Father within the one Divine Being." The truth for which the doctrine of pre-existence stood is, he holds, sufficiently safeguarded "by the view that the Christ-values pre-existed in the one personal God." His reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation now follows: We may believe in ethical affinity between God and man, in an "infinite-finite" relation; and, transcending dualism, may reach some such formula as to Christ as "the form of His consciousness is human, its content is Divine."

I cannot regard this as a modern and better way of conserving the religious values which patristic theology was intended to protect. It is a radical break with New Testament doctrine, and, positively, is comparable to an up-to-date Ritschlianism. Moreover, it does not conserve all the religious values which the Christian Church has found in Christ. Neither Dr. Bartlet nor Professor Edwards suggests the importance of

attention to the Atonement, and to the Church as Christ's mystical body, and to the Eucharist as the devotional centre where Christ, the Lamb of sacrifice, becomes the food of His people. The three remaining articles, by Mr. F. C. Bryan on "Christ in Present Experience," by Mr. H. H. Farmer on "Christ's Right to Our Worship," and by Mr. Malcolm Spencer on "The Church's Witness to Her Lord," certainly help towards a richer presentation of the truth: there is much in them which suggests a more satisfying type of doctrine than that which we should derive from the immediately preceding articles. But the highest points which they reach find a better background in the language of the Creeds than in the theological reconstructions of Professor Edwards. I would suggest that if Free Churchmen were more accustomed to the recitation of the Creeds they would realize that the great Christological phrases are something much more than the formal theologoumena of an antiquated dogmatic.

With all that is attractive and truly Christian in it, this book does not belong to the greater Christological literature. It is too dependent on current modes of thought, too much concerned with psychology and not enough with ontology. Its Christology is not "humanitarian," and yet the writers seem to me unduly concerned to assure us that Christ is, indeed, truly human. But that is not the assurance which the Catholic Church, as a whole, specially desires, nor is it at that point that the strongest and most fruitful type of Christian religious experience develops. It is to writers nurtured in a different school of theology that we must go if we wish to have our eyes more widely opened to the splendour of the doctrine of God incarnate in Christ.

J. K. MOZLEY.

A CENTURY OF ANGLO-CATHOLICISM. By Herbert Leslie Stewart, Professor of Philosophy, Dalhousie University. J. M. Dent and Sons. 10s. 6d.

Anglo-Catholicism has been the subject of a number of interesting studies in recent years by writers outside these shores. In *The Oxford Revival* the Swedish scholar, Dr. Brilioth, showed himself to have grasped the underlying spirit and principles of the movement with rare insight and penetration; and his book was acknowledged on all sides to be a contribution of real importance to the literature of the subject. A little later the *Church Quarterly Review* published a long and most original article on Anglo-Catholicism from the pen of Dr.

Friedrich Heiler, already well known as the author of *Das Gebet* and of *Der Catholicismus*. For Dr. Heiler the movement in its contemporary phase was obviously pointing to a combination of authority with freedom in religion such as neither Rome nor Lutheranism could supply; and its principles, though of national *provenance*, appeared capable of fruitful importation into Europe. This year Professor Stewart, a Presbyterian and Professor of Philosophy at Halifax, N.S., has given us in 400 pages a kind of cross-bench or "aeroplane" view of the whole story, down to the second rejection of the revised Prayer Book by the House of Commons. The book is learned, apt in quotation, admirably written, and at once critical and sympathetic. No one who is interested in the history of English religion and thought during the past century can afford to neglect it.

Professor Stewart is more concerned with the ideas of the movement than with the record of its pastoral and practical expansion; and the main theme of the book is the continuity and development of Anglo-Catholic theology from *Tracts for the Times* through *Lux Mundi* to *Essays Catholic and Critical*. The basic belief of Newman and his friends was that our Lord had given to the world not only an authoritative faith but also an authoritative institution; and it was the supernatural claims made for the Church that brought the movement into conflict with the Erastian assumptions of early Victorian religion. At the same time, as Pusey realized, this Church for which these claims were made was Anglican and not Roman; and it counted among the principles on which it rested a respect for liberty and a scope for the work of reason which, though they might recede into the background in the years of opening challenge, were yet part and parcel of the heritage that was being vindicated. It was these principles which were given their full weight in *Lux Mundi*; and the result was a work both of doctrine and of apologetic which for two generations has had a profound influence on the teaching and temper of the whole English Church.

Professor Stewart regards *Essays Catholic and Critical* as marking a further stage in the same process. He finds the same appeal to persuasion, the same discarding of doctrinal positions once thought important, the same endeavour to interpret the faith in the light of contemporary knowledge as in the case of *Lux Mundi*; and yet observes that, though many of the views advanced might be called Modernist, the book has not been disowned in any way by the Anglo-Catholic movement. There are obvious difficulties in the way of an attempt on my part to appraise Professor Stewart's interesting and appreciative

treatment of *Essays Catholic and Critical*; and it is the less necessary here, in that I have considered its main points at some length in the Preface to the third edition of that volume.

Our author has some interesting remarks to make on the "ritualistic" side of the movement. He seems to me to exaggerate the gulf between the parish priests and the theologians; the former have been far more alive to the progress of theology than he allows, while the latter have had the bent and interest of their studies much influenced by contact with pastoral experience and needs. There have been, no doubt, both among clergy and laity those who deserve ridicule (like that in which Professor Stewart indulges on pp. 257, 306-7) for their morbid preoccupation in the *minutiæ* of ceremonial. But they have been a tiny minority; and what the Professor fails to realize is that much of this interest in outward detail is of the same simple type as the members of an ordinary family show in the details of their house and its appointments. A Catholic is a person who understands the phrase "the household of God" in a quite homely and human way. And he feels just as the prophet Haggai did (Hag. i. 4) about those who will expend great care on their own houses but reck little of the appearance of the House of God.

At the same time Professor Stewart lays bare with firm hand the inconsistency of that type of Modernism which charges Anglo-Catholics with law-breaking and yet claims to dispense itself from the faith of the Church.

> There are Modernists whose weekly avowal of a creed in the essence of which they have no vital belief should stop them from all railing accusation against men whose duplicity is at least no worse than their own. . . . This development has a sinister as well as a ludicrous side. It has brought us near to fulfilment of Frederic Harrison's guess that for "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*" there might yet be substituted "*Intra ecclesiam nulla veritas.*"

The problem is a real one, and is not to be solved by any facile policy of "Live and let live," as has been proposed by some Anglo-Catholics in recent years. If the Church of England is to continue to be a Church, and not a mere collection of contraries, a genuine synthesis must be found and limits set. Where is the new Hooker to be found?

Professor Stewart's discussion of the Prayer Book issue is fair and well-informed on most points; and, though he considers that in presenting the case for the new Book the Bishops overemphasized the administrative grounds for it at the expense of others, his sympathies are with them and not with the House of Commons.

In a concluding chapter entitled "Quo Vadimus," he shows

that he understands the true genius of Anglo-Catholicism and the reason for its continued vitality. Through it, he says,

> . . . there was at length found a place for that sort of worshipper not to be classed as either Protestant or Catholic; the sort for whom Romanism is impossible, the old Evangelicalism is absurd, and the new Modernism is no more than an intellectual exercise, but upon whom the historic Faith has none the less laid hold, and for whom the very heart of this is in the symbolism of the Altar. . . . He knows himself to owe everything to the climate of the Church in which he was born. . . . He is an Anglo-Catholic because he has discovered with joy a religious home in which what he knows to have been the actual process in his own case is judged neither abnormal nor unintelligent, but natural and right.

These are words that might well have been written by Dean Church. And that fact is a fair indication of the consistency of the movement during the century that has elapsed since Keble preached his Assize Sermon. E. G. SELWYN.

NOTICES

ST. FRANCIS DE SALES, 1567-1622. By E. K. Sanders. S.P.C.K. 12s.

Few English writers are so well versed in the religious history of seventeenth-century France as Miss Sanders, and she has now added to her studies of St. Chantal, Bossuet, and other spiritual leaders of the period, an excellent account of the life and writings of the great Bishop of Geneva, St. Francis de Sales. It is an extraordinary life, that of this scion of the French aristocracy, born and brought up to high political position, who renounced his own and his father's prospects to be ordained priest, and at the age of twenty-six resolved to make every moment of every day part of his preparation for the next morning's Mass; who began his ministry with some years of relative failure as a missioner among the Calvinists, and ended by being the guide and director of a St. Chantal; and who, though always an exile from his see city of Geneva, was one of the most effective bishops of that or any other age. It was a signal example of the triumph of character, touched and exalted by the supernatural, over every obstacle that human life can offer. As Miss Sanders says, no higher testimony to the consistent holiness of his life could be given than that his mother and the rest of the family and household at Sales should have submitted themselves, from the day of his ordination as priest, to his spiritual guidance.

One secret of St. Francis's power as a bishop lay in the resolve which he once confessed to be "more the poor priest than I have ever been." He had an infinite solicitude for each individual, whether of high or lowly station. "These small people," he wrote, "whom you call unimportant, want to be heard and helped over their affairs as much as do the prominent folk in theirs. If one soul is as much troubled for insignificant cause as another might be for some great matter, is that a reason for not offering comfort to the first and sending her away content? The small affairs of humble people are just as important to them as are great matters to the great. Are we not pledged to all? They come seeking consolation; are we not bound to give it them?" The same spirit breathes through the

letters of Bishop King and Bishop Wilkinson; with them, as with St. Francis, it was the secret of their influence.

The second half of Miss Sanders's book is concerned with St. Francis's devotional writings, with those to whom they were addressed, and with the story of the founding of the Visitation. The study of the "Introduction to a Devout Life" is of particular value, as it will lead the reader through a book which is to an unusual degree representative of a great tradition of Christian piety. By its sanity, breadth of view, and broad human interest, unspoilt by rigorism or sentimentality, this tradition is recognizable as much in our own Jeremy Taylor and William Law as in the Bishop of Geneva, though in St. Francis it is, of course, mixed with a French strain which has a charm all of its own. And it is a tradition which espouses art as well as piety: Renaissance architecture, like that of Palladio and Sir Christopher Wren, and the poetry of Dryden and Herbert and Vaughan, are genuine fruits of it. Signs are not wanting that this spirit is what men are again looking for today. If so, St. Francis de Sales will be one of those who will be recognized as having made a great contribution to its first development in Europe.

E. G. SELWYN.

THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. By Wilbur Urban. Allen and Unwin. 16s.

This is a notable work and an important contribution towards the reinforcement and restatement in contemporary terms of the philosophy of the great tradition. It is a clear indication of the necessity for a return to the chief distinguishing features of the perennial philosophy. Professor Urban describes and criticizes the characteristics of that "modernistic" movement which now reveals its fundamental incapacity to deal with the supreme issues for thought. There is, and must continue to increase in intensity, a return to philosophy of the main stream.

The author finds the distinguishing features of the "great tradition" in philosophy in the affirmation that the world is meaningful. His own distinct contribution to the unfolding of this intelligibility is the showing forth of the inseparability of "value" and "reality." To attempt to divorce these can only end in unintelligibility. In the attempt to make such a divorce and in the denial of ultimate intelligibility he finds the notes of "modernism" in philosophy, a type of thought which is fast becoming outworn, and which should be distinguished from the best examples of modern constructive thought.

It is clear that this work will prove to be both challenging and influential. It will become indispensable to all those who wish to harvest the positive results of the best contemporary insight. These will be found to be in line with the great systems of the past wherein are affirmed the intelligible character of the world. Its importance for those who study philosophical theology is evident. Perhaps it may enable some to extend the borders of their intellectual respect.

There might with advantage have been a more adequate discussion of Mind as pure Act, and of the bearing of this concept upon History. We cannot afford to neglect Gentile nor to fail to relate whatever truth is in his teaching with wider, more transcendental, concepts. Professor Urban promises us a further volume with the title of *The Language of Metaphysics*. This, together with his earlier volume in the same series, would make an impressive presentation of the deepest insights into philosophical truth. Profound as it is, this volume is full of literary interest and allusion, and its production constitutes an event in philosophical enquiry. F. W. BUTLER.

MYSTERIES OF THE SOUL. By Richard Müller Freienfels. Translated by Bernard Miall. Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

The author holds that Christianity is outworn, and that its doctrine of God and the soul is illogical and ethically indefensible. The book is by no means, therefore, as its title might suggest to some, a devotional treatise for the aid of those who would cultivate the inner life on the basis of Christian truth. It takes the form of a series of six essays discoursing psychologically and philosophically of a life-force which seems to be ours for a brief space, though it really possesses us, and is then emancipated from the restraining channel of our individuality. There are some interesting passages, particularly the section on the Americanization of the Soul, but it all leads vaguely nowhere, and the reader is left to look wistfully for a religion of the future which shall give "religious depth and consecration to a civilization which is in danger of becoming shallow and sterile."

O. HARDMAN.

EXPERIENCE OF GOD: A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE GROUNDS OF CHRISTIAN CONVICTION. By Herbert H. Farmer. S.C.M. 5s.

This brilliantly-written book puts the case for Christian Theism better than anything we have read before. The oft-quoted warning against "little books" loses its force if, as in this case, the author of the little book has himself read all the big ones, and has the art of writing in such a way that the reader will be drawn to them too. Mr. Farmer's central thesis is the familiar one that there is in the category of the "sacred"—as exemplified in conduct which expresses the absolute values of goodness and truth and beauty, and in the response of the soul of man to such values—that which (since "value" implies "purpose") we must recognize as "the touch of the Spirit of God" upon human life. The argument from this "coercive element" in religion is then shown to be reinforced by the fact that religion is pragmatically defensible, since it, and it alone, resolves the disharmony of which man is conscious in his relations to the world of nature, to his fellows, and to his own deepest aspirations. Finally, the author points out that the religious hypothesis "not only shines in its own light with a certain inherent coerciveness, and helps a man in the practical task of adjustment to his world, but satisfies his mind by revealing on reflection the further coerciveness of rational consistency and harmony with the whole available body of knowledge and experience." So much is contained in Part I., which, it is to be noted, is philosophical rather than religious, or religious only in the widest sense: it presents the strongest case there is to be made for theism in general, and is of great value as showing how strong that case is (which is sometimes denied), even apart from Christ. In Part III., which deals with "Jesus Christ and the Belief in God," the argument is *a fortiori*: the author takes each of the elements in religion already referred to—the coercive, the pragmatic and the reflective—and shows, with most telling force, how in the light of our Lord, considered as the completely adequate revelation of God, they find their fullest and final expression and justification. Part II. is devoted to "challenges" to belief in God and the ways in which they can be met—"challenges of bias" (*e.g.*, the argument based on the enormous quantity and variety of religious beliefs); "challenges of theory" (*e.g.*, the psycho-

logist's explanation of religion as man's "projection" of his own desires), and "challenges of fact" (*e.g.*, the facts of suffering and sin).

This is a very bald and inadequate account of what seems to us a book of quite outstanding value and importance. We should like to think that it would be very widely used as the basis of clerical study-circles. It is important that we should familiarize ourselves with what, on the intellectual side, "secular civilization" (at its best and on the highest levels) stands for, and with the case against it. There could be no better introduction to such a study than this book of Mr. Farmer's. One reader at any rate is intensely grateful to him for having written it.

C. E. HUDSON.

LA PENSÉE INTUITIVE. I. Au delà du Discours. By Edouard le Roy, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: Boiveri. 15 fr.

Following closely upon profound studies, published in the *Bibliothèque de la Revue des Cours et Conférences*, on the place of "*l'empire de l'Homme*" in nature (*L'exigence idéaliste et le fait de l'évolution* and *Lès origines humaines et l'évolution de l'intelligence*), M. le Roy gives to us this first volume of two on Intuitive Thought. Needless to say, it is a work of great literary merit and charm. It is also a profound interpretation, defence, and expansion of that view of Intuition with which Henri Bergson has made us familiar. Being very lucid, there is, perhaps, no single volume from which we may gain so clear a view of this characteristically modernistic view of the intelligence. It is made very plain that this view definitely departs from that which prevails in the philosophy of the "great tradition." It is well to say this because M. le Roy's statement of a perilous hypothesis is so ably presented that he might almost persuade the reader to be a Bergsonian.

Almost, but not altogether; for this immediate to which Intuition, but not the Intelligence, is to return after a breaking away from the primitive immediate, is very elusive. And, if you could grasp it, how are you to make it intelligible to yourself and to others except by use of that critical and constructive intelligence which the author so drastically discounts? M. le Roy is convincing in his refusal to allow the abstractions of "a deified natural science" to occupy the whole field of knowledge, but he places himself outside of the conditions of attaining the intelligible by constituting intuition both judge and jury in its own case. He does no more than show that interpretation means the synthetic judgment, and aims at systematic correlation and unification "as of a world." Much that he writes on this point might be regarded as a clear statement of the ideas, prominent in the logic of Bosanquet, of the "concrete universal." But in so far as he is successful in the logic of his case he decrees the abolition of his unwarranted distrust of the intelligence as that aims at the accomplishment of its synthetic task. In brief, in so far as he discredits intelligence, he discredits his own subtle dialectic. Especially is this the case at the height of his argument when he seeks to prove that intuition is veritable thought having its own method and discipline.

But his logic is simply the counterpart of his own conception of reality as movement and becoming. If the real itself is this flow and onrush, with its own immanental finalities, reason itself must be a mere instrument forced into the mould of this great stream. Nature determines

the forms of the intelligence after her own image, as instruments of her purposes and not as means of gaining truth. Why out of such a series of illusions forged in the interests of life identification with the immediate should be possible is by no means self-evident. But even if such identification were possible through sympathetic imagination, *at the most, understanding could only reach its source* and find that to be a deceptive power bent on moulding experience and knowledge in the forms of its own varied interests. The philosophical form of intelligibility is thereby voided and made intrinsically impossible.

But why should the content of metaphysical insight be so fixed upon the immediate and not upon its interpretation and its correlation with genuine concepts, those, *e.g.*, of its value, origin, and meaning? Le Roy calls upon us to leave the primary immediate of uncriticized feeling, but to what do we return? certainly not to any mere immediate at all, but to the interpretation of the data of experience in their several worths and in their totality of meanings, the real object of the metaphysical quest.

There are some who profess to find in this depreciation of the intelligence and in this assumed return to the immediate a means of definition of *la spiritualité*. It would be more exact to describe them as together constituting "the great refusal." M. le Roy devotes himself to the attempt to identify the method of intuitive thought, according to his description thereof, with that which "the masters of the interior life" discern "in the order of spirituality." The identification cannot be sustained either with regard to the Object of such insight or to the method of contemplation and the discipline preliminary thereto. In this connection especially the conviction that all true thought is grounded in the Divine Reason or in the phrase of St Thomas Aquinas, "participates in the Logos in an eminent identity" (*Contra Gentiles*, I. xli.) maintains itself. Here, in particular, as throughout the universe of discourse, Bosanquet's clear affirmation is relevant—"the immediate cannot stand; no more in the world of logical apprehension than in those of moral service and religious devotion. Everywhere to possess Reality is an arduous task."

In so far as le Roy's "dynamic scheme" is motived by a recognition of the concrete richness of finite experience it may contribute towards a fuller appreciation of the concepts of energy and of pure Act as these are developed by Aquinas. Indeed, the future of this insight lies not with a doctrine of movement which makes all ideas of "end" meaningless, but in a doctrine of the possibility of the attainment of significant goals because of the existence of the *ens realissimum*.

It is significant that M. Julien Benda, in his recent book *La Fui de L'Éternal*" (Paris: Edition de la nouvelle revue française, 1929), connected the "particularism" of Bergson with that of W. James and of Nietzsche as an element in the modern "trahison des clercs," and with reference thereto quotes: "Ils ont changé la glorie du Dieu incorruptible en des images où ils adorent l'Homme corruptible." (Saint Paul, Rom. i. 23.) In nothing is this transformation more evident than in the identification of becoming with reality and in the instrumental theory of the function of mind. It is with a nobler realization and with a far better hope that we may say, "*Da mihi intellectum et vivam.*"

F. W. Butler.

DIE VORCHRISTLICHE UND FRÜHCHRISTLICHE ZEIT DES PAULUS. By E. Barnikol. Mühlau: Kiel. M. 3.50.

This is the first of a new series of Kiel monographs to be edited by Dr. Barnikol. Its 96 pages are entirely devoted to a minute study of the autobiographical details given in Galatians, in so far as they refer to the time before St. Paul's conversion or immediately following it. The author insists that the Epistle must be studied entirely by itself without any thought of the evidence found in the Acts. He reaches some interesting conclusions. From v. 11 it may be deduced that Saul was a Jewish missionary before his conversion. "Among my countrymen" (i. 14) should be translated "in meiner (Pharisäer-)genossenschaft," *i.e.*, among the students, or young Pharisees. Verse 17b is translated "I went away into Arabia and returned unto Damascus"—two ways of expressing the same thing; Damascus then was part of Arabia. The churches of Judæa in i. 23 heard say: "He that once persecuted us (*i.e.*, Christianity) is now a Christian." "Churches" must include Jerusalem. Note that the persecution is thus laid in the north, the speakers being the Christians round about Damascus. In this way the otherwise insoluble problem presented by the words "I was unknown by face unto the Churches of Judæa" is solved. We cannot exclude Jerusalem from these Churches and it is incredible, if Acts can be trusted, that the apostle was unknown at Jerusalem. But the solution involves the fundamental untrustworthiness of Acts.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE CHRISTIAN AND BIRTH CONTROL. By Edward Lyttelton, D.D. S.P.C.K. 3s. 6d.

Dr. Lyttelton always strikes the prophetic note: he is rather like the prophet Amos with his insistence on law, stern duty, obedience to divine commands. Like the prophet he is apt to be discursive, to condemn many things not relative to the particular subject on which he writes, and like the prophet to utter golden sentences. This book, *The Christian and Birth Control*, is an appeal to the bishops to speak out and give guidance to their flocks on the subject of license in married life and indulgence among the unmarried, on the rightness or wrongness of contraceptives. His book is given in the form of a discussion between a vicar, a doctor, and a social worker who soon departs from the discussion—too easily shaken from the position he held. The book would gain in value had a firm believer in birth control been introduced, able to hold his own against the doctor and the vicar. Dr. Lyttelton rather overstates his case, having no use for casuistry, never allowing that there may be exceptions from every law. He has done well in calling attention to a subject which is perplexing many consciences. People are asking the clergy whether the practice is right or wrong. He is right in saying that a violation of the laws of nature is bound to bring disaster. He does good service in showing that the present situation is not one which will bring future judgment on the nation, but is itself a judgment on the sins "of the fathers" in their desire for pleasure and ease: the older not the younger generation is to be blamed. The real value of the book is to be found not so much in its treatment of the particular subject as in its call to heroism and self-control, in its healthy catholic puritanism, and in its appeal to the bishops to put first things first, to give guidance on things which are really vital, to speak

with authority as guardians of the Christian Faith. We could wish that our authorities would take to heart words of Voltaire quoted in this book: "Offer only things that are reasonable, and all the world will answer, 'We knew as much as that.' But enjoin things that are hard and impracticable; paint the deity as ever armed with the thunder; make blood run before the altars, and you will win the multitude's ear, and everybody will say of you, 'He must be right, or he would not so boldly proclaim things so marvellous.'"

J. H. B. MACE.

DER TOD ALEXANDERS VI. By Joseph Schnitzer. Ernst Reinhardt: Munich. M.3.80 and 5.50.

In the last generation attempts were made, as, for example, by Creighton and by Pastor, to whitewash the Borgias and to excuse their failings as being typical of the age. Against this tendency there has been a reaction (seen, for example, in Portagliotti's *I Borgia* published in 1921), and it must certainly be admitted that recent discoveries, as, for example, the letters found in the Gonzaga archives at Mantua, go to show that the attempt to defend them is not likely to be entirely successful. Dr. Schnitzer, perhaps because he is a great authority on Savonarola, is another scholar who is ready to believe the very worst of the Borgias. He is prejudiced above all against Cesare (here going beyond Portagliotti) whom he calls repeatedly the murderer of his brother. Now it is very probable that the Duke of Gandia was murdered by Cardinal Cesare, and Italian historians such as Count Pasolini openly call him the fratricide, but there is no definite evidence of any kind to show that he was responsible.

The subject of the present monograph is the question whether Alexander VI. died of poison or not. The evidence, when we remember that his death occurred in a literary age, is surprisingly contradictory. Some authorities say that the feast at which the fatal drug was supposed to have been taken was held in the Vatican, but the bulk place it at Cardinal Hadrian's villa on the Janiculum. The date of the meal is also disputed, various days in August, from the 6th to the 15th, being put forward by contemporaries. It is agreed, however, that all the guests were taken ill after the feast, either immediately or after a short interval. But this is not surprising when it is remembered that fever was raging at the time and that the guests remained until a late hour in the open air. But though the evidence is contradictory it can be divided up into two well-defined categories. Those who were on the spot all regarded the pope's death as due to natural causes—this was the opinion of the papal Master of Ceremonies, the famous John Burchard, as well as of the Venetian ambassador, Giustinian. The physicians reported that their master had died of apoplexy following fever, but they were, perhaps, not altogether reliable witnesses. It was those who had not the full opportunity of knowing who spread the rumour of poison. Dr. Schnitzer, following the great Ranke, regards the rumours of poison as justified (some said that the poison was intended for another and taken by the pope and his son in error) and he examines all the evidence at great length. He tries to show that the symptoms are those of arsenical poisoning (the famous Borgia poison, the *Cantarella*, was based on arsenic), but as the most reliable authorities state that an interval of some days elapsed between the feast

and the pope's serious illness and that his condition varied from day to day, the symptoms are those of a tertian fever, not of arsenical poisoning, unless fresh doses were being administered.

Dr. Schnitzer has produced an interesting and important treatise, but I do not feel that he makes his point: the evidence of Burchard and Giustinian is too strong to be upset, and his attempts to discredit them do not seem to me to have succeeded. None the less, there is no doubt that the evidence is contradictory and no quite conclusive result can be attained.

L. Elliott Binns.

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